January 11, 2019

The Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review Panel
c/o Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada
235 Queen Street, 1st Floor
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0H5

VMedia Inc. (“VMedia”) is grateful for the opportunity to submit comments on the broadcasting and telecommunications legislative review (the “Review”) initiated by Innovation, Science and Economic Development (“ISED”) Canada.

Executive Summary

The Review

ES1.The issues outlined in the terms of reference and the themes described by the panel appointed by ISED to review the relevant legislation (the “Panel”) are extensive. There are seven terms of reference relating to issues to consider in connection with the Telecommunications and Radiocommunication Acts, and eight in connection with the Broadcasting Act. In addition, there are four themes set out by the Panel intended to “help guide its work and structure meaningful dialogue during its consultation process”.

ES2.Among those 19 elements of consideration, we note that the word competition is mentioned only twice, with little elaboration or context.

ES3.As the second point under both the Telecommunications and Radiocommunication Acts, under the heading “Competition, Innovation, and Affordability”, the question is asked, “Are legislative changes warranted to better promote competition, innovation and affordability?”

ES4.In addition, competition is mentioned at the very end of the first of the Panel’s themes, “Reducing Barriers to Access by All Canadian to Advanced Telecommunications Networks”. All of the rest of that theme focuses on the
achievements of telephone and cable companies, and the heavy lifting ahead of them as they keep up with digital transformation.

ES5. There is no mention at all of competition in the terms of reference relating to the Broadcasting Act.

ES6. Similarly, regarding consideration of (i) Canadians as consumers of those services, who collectively pay nearly $45 billion per year for those services to a very small number of providers, and (ii) the need for a close examination of whether they are being well served, at reasonable prices, compared to other industrialized nations, there is very little.

ES7. This absence of focus on competition, with no acknowledgement of the problematic state of consumer choice in services and resultant meaningful competition, and the entitlement of consumers to a competitive market in the provision of services which are not just essential, but absolutely and increasingly central to their everyday lives, is disappointing.

**Recommendation:** VMedia’s central comment is to urge the Panel to review its themes, and add to them the specific consideration of whether Canadian consumers are well-served by the current regulatory framework, which has permitted a level of concentration in the telecom and broadcasting industries virtually unparalleled in the industrialized world.

**The Economic Interests of Consumers**

ES8. The lack of focus on competition and the entitlement of consumers to world-leading, rather than world-lagging, telecommunications services, is particularly relevant because telecommunications (and broadcasting) services comprise the fourth largest household expenditure after shelter, food and transportation.

ES9. Yet, unlike those needs, which are met by a myriad of competing suppliers ensuring fair pricing disciplined by market forces, telecom in each of the markets across Canada has always been and still is today largely a duopoly, dominated by a total of five major incumbents, operating in pairs in the markets across the country.

ES10. Three of them account for 92% of mobile revenues, a market share that is steadily increasing. One of the three focuses primarily on the Quebec market, leaving much of the rest of the country to the other two major providers.

ES11. Five incumbents account for 87% of fixed internet revenues, but that does not suggest that the five compete against each other. In fact there are only two providers in any given market, a cable and a telecom provider, and that duopoly more typically shares that 87% of the market it serves.
ES12. In 2016, a year in which wage growth was 0.4%, and the Consumer Price Index barely budged, average household mobile and internet expenditures, paid to those few providers, rose 5.5% and 6.5% respectively. In that same year, the lowest quintile of Canadian households, those with less than $32,090 of household income, spent 8.6% of their annual income on communications services.

ES13. This is no surprise, as even a recent study commissioned by ISED itself (the “Wall Report”) shows that Canadian wireless rates are among the highest in the world, and by some accounts that gap is widening.

ES14. It is especially important that there be a greater focus on the economic experience of consumers in view of the impending introduction of 5G. A particular examination should be undertaken as part of the Panel’s process going forward to consider how the introduction of 5G should be managed.

**Competition in Broadband Fixed Internet**

ES15. In the Wall Report it was shown that Canada also lags in the pricing of fixed internet. But in this case there are competitors, in the form of independent internet service providers ("ISPs") such as VMedia, which purchase wholesale access to incumbent facilities to offer them at retail prices competitive with the incumbents. VMedia and other ISPs pay substantial tariffs for such access, calculated through rigorous costing processes conducted by the CRTC to ensure that all of the costs of the incumbents associated with such access are covered as well as a substantial mark up.

ES16. Even so, ISPs are able to offer internet plans virtually identical to those offered by the incumbents for prices 12.5% to 35% lower.

ES17. This has been achieved despite:

a. A tariff pricing framework that is not reflective of actual incumbent costs, nor transparent,

b. Ongoing efforts by incumbents to destabilize, undermine and ultimately eliminate the ISP sector, to allow continued economic exploitation of Canadian consumers, and

c. The resultant stifling of innovation which has made Canada an outlier among developed nations in broadband services and enabling the digital economy.
**The Role of ISPs**

ES18. Despite uneconomic and arbitrary tariffs imposed on ISPs through consistently problematic costing processes, ISPs have been able to offer services identical or superior to those of the incumbents to Canadians at prices as much as 50% lower.

ES19. This is because incumbents generate margins of up to 90% on internet services, while ISPs have made do on margins as low as 25%. That delta represents economically unjustifiable tariffs, which serve as a proxy for purportedly just and reasonable wholesale prices.

ES20. In addition, ISPs have introduced innovative product offerings. It was the ISPs' introduction of unlimited packages over 10 years ago, responding to the already growing demand for video content over the internet, that led to the usage-based billing controversy of 2011 and the accompanying consumer revolt.

ES21. These benefits have been delivered within a framework that results in an inconsistent regulatory approach. The framework is intended to implement a policy that nurtures the formation and growth of the ISP sector. It has instead resulted in policies and tariff procedures, and an administrative regime intended to regulate the behavior of incumbents, that has largely left ISPs vulnerable to persistent efforts of incumbents to prevent new entities from forming, and to put existing ones out of business.

**The Present Crisis**

ES22. ISPs currently face yet another existential crisis in the form of a new regulatory policy (the “FTTP Access Policy”) which mandates the granting to ISPs of access to new fibre to the premises (“FTTP”) networks being rolled out by the incumbents.

ES23. The crisis ISPs face has two elements, one long term, the other short term. In the long term, the ability of ISPs to be able to fund their access to FTTP facilities, under the new disaggregated framework contained in the FTTP Access Policy, is questionable at best.

ES24. Moreover, the requirements of the FTTP Access Policy that ISPs build out to the many points of connection that the disaggregated model requires are animated by a desire to have facilities built by ISPs, in an acknowledgement of the mandate to encourage facilities development in the Policy Direction of 2006 (the "Policy Direction").

ES25. In the short term, and after a lengthy process marked yet again by extensive delays by the incumbents, the CRTC initiated an interim tariff proceeding for accessing incumbent fibre pending the implementation of that disaggregated framework.
ES26. During this delay, more and more fibre had been (and continues to be) installed across an expanding urban footprint, significantly increasing the localized monopolies that sprout up with each FTTP-served building and neighbourhood. But even more problematic are the tariffs set by the CRTC.

ES27. For example, the interim approved monthly FTTP wholesale access rate for one telecom incumbent was set at, and remains, $121.79. Per month. Per home. This, when the highest retail price that incumbent quotes as at today’s date for 1Gbps service is $104.95.

ES28. In the event, in November 2018 CNOC filed a review and vary application (the “CNOC Application”) with the CRTC, asking that it reconsider the FTTP Access Policy. The substance of the application is that, as structured, the FTTP Access Policy makes it impossible for ISPs to participate in such a way that they can continue to serve their existing markets and survive. It also highlights the unintended consequence of the FTTP Access Policy’s adherence to the Policy Direction, which orders the CRTC to pursue policy objectives of the Telecommunications Act “with a view to increasing incentives for innovation in and construction of competing telecommunications network facilities”. As structured, the FTTP Access Policy creates no incentive whatsoever for ISPs to do any such thing.

ES29. The Policy Direction is commendable insofar as it provides imperatives to promote competition. But the requirement that consideration be given to the creation of additional facilities is flawed.

**Recommendation:** For these reasons, VMedia recommends that the Policy Direction be immediately amended to remove the requirement that the CRTC be required to consider the investment in and construction of competing telecommunications network facilities in implementing the policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Telecommunications Act.

**A Flawed Tariff Framework**

ES30. VMedia believes that existing costing processes have shown themselves to be obstacles to the development of a robust and stable competitive market.

ES31. Moreover, the tariff framework allows incumbents to dramatically undercut ISP pricing, knowing full well the prices paid by ISPs to them for identical services. This is an insidious form of predatory pricing, as it is the ISP’s supplier that is trying to force the ISP, the customer, out of business.

ES32. The uncertainty in wholesale access tariff costing processes should be eliminated. Mindful of the fact that the margin over costs of facilities is 90%, an assumption should be made as to what is a reasonable ongoing fixed wholesale price for access, set as a percentage of the retail price set by the incumbent.
**Recommendation**: VMedia recommends that tariff be fixed through a formulaic mechanism introduced through legislated changes to the Telecommunications Act, and updated every five years by regulation.

**Incumbent Efforts to Sabotage ISPs**

ES33. Since its formation in 2012, VMedia has experienced deliberate and concerted efforts by certain incumbents to prevent VMedia from launching, and then after it launched, to target and obliterate its business entirely. All of these tactics were either permitted within the regulatory framework, or if prohibited, the prohibitions were not accompanied by any practical, timely, or adequately punitive recourse.

**The Four Year Stall**

ES34. VMedia first requested a third party internet access (“TPIA”) arrangement with an incumbent in 2011. Regulations only prescribe a timetable for proceeding with a request for TPIA service once the process is underway. For example once an incumbent enters into an NDA, the clock starts to tick. However, there is no deadline stipulated for commencing the negotiation process.

ES35. Citing backlogs, blackouts, and inadequate resources the incumbent stalled VMedia for nearly four years. Even once it agreed to enter into negotiations, and start the prescribed clock, the incumbent imposed onerous security guarantee requirements which delayed the launch for another year. In the result, VMedia launched its direct TPIA service in May, 2016. The delay cost VMedia dearly in margin payments to the reseller, as well as considerable market good will and loss of reputation due to the complexities of installing customers and troubleshooting.

**The TV Stall**

ES36. In order to launch its BDU service, VMedia required an affiliate arrangement with the major vertically integrated entities (“VIEs”). Without those deals with all of them, VMedia could not launch its TV service.

ES37. In this case too, one of the VIEs refused to enter into negotiations. Instead, it delayed and delayed entering into an NDA, a prerequisite to sharing their rate card, until VMedia provided a TV channel packaging plan with retail prices. This of course was impossible without the rate card. So VMedia went in circles with the VIE for over a year, trying to push negotiations forward while facing the same choice between hoping the eventual deal would come sooner cooperatively than through a more adversarial process before the CRTC.

ES38. Finally a deal was completed, allowing VMedia to launch its brand, with both internet and TV, in April 2013, a year and a half after its initial request for services.
ES39. There are no punitive measures to discourage anti-competitive behavior, so independents are victims of ongoing skirmishes, delays and even efforts to eliminate competitors entirely, in a deliberate strategy to exploit the existing framework to reduce or eliminate competition.

ES40. The relationship between incumbents and ISPs is grossly asymmetrical, highlighted by the irreducible fact that the supplier of all of the ISPs’ goods and services is also a very deep-pocketed competitor that wants the ISP segment to disappear. This is not a complaint against the incumbents. They are acting with perfect economic logic, given the framework that defines the scope of its abilities to act.

ES41. It is the framework that must change

**Recommendation:** VMedia recommends a regime similar to the one administered by the Commission for Complaints for Telecom-Televison Services be created to adjudicated issues arising between ISPs and incumbents. This regime would provide, among other things:

a. for expedited relief against any behavior by an incumbent that would not be reasonable for a bona fide supplier of goods and services acting in good faith with the intention of maximizing market revenues for those goods and services

b. that costs of any process incurred by an ISP seeking to enforce its rights be borne by the incumbent and

c. that damages, both pecuniary and punitive, at the minimum sufficient to serve as a deterrent to such behavior, be payable by the incumbent.

**Competition in Mobile Services**

ES42. As shown above, there are currently no alternatives to the five mobile providers which dominate the market in Canada, 92% of which is shared among just three of them. While the Minister has made clear the Cabinet’s desire for more competition in the market, including the development of a framework which would allow mobile virtual networks operators (“MVNOs”), which are non-facilities based competitors that are available in abundance in many markets around the world, including the US, no steps have yet been taken in that direction.

ES43. Faced with the introduction of 5G, which promises to greatly expand the importance of mobile services in the lives of all Canadians, it is important to consider how that technology can, at its inception, be made available in such a way that Canadians can feel secure that they have abundant choices, fair prices, excellent service and practices that place the highest value on their privacy and safety. In
VMedia’s view, this can best be achieved through the creation of an independent wholesale 5G network.

**The Need for a Third Party Wholesale Network**

ES44. Many GHz of spectrum will be awarded for 5G mobile broadband services over the coming years, many times more than what has already been awarded since 1984, as regulators worldwide embark on a new wave of spectrum auctions focused on what is referred to as mid-band (e.g. 3.5 GHz) and mmWave spectrum bands.

ES45. Given the current levels of competition, services and pricing for mobile services in Canada described above, VMedia urges the Canadian government to take the appropriate steps to ensure that this vast and valuable public resource – valuable not just economically but strategically, and crucial to enabling Canadians to innovate and compete globally - does not end up under the same dominant influence as afflicts mobile services today.

ES46. It is an opportunity to ignite vibrant competition in wireless services, generate more investment by incumbents currently providing mobile services (mobile network operators or “MNOs”) and other segments of the private sector in mobile broadband networks in Canada, and move Canada from the bottom ranks of OECD nations to the top.

ES47. To this end, VMedia proposes that all future spectrum awards in Canada, starting with the award for 3.5 GHz spectrum, include a significant amount of spectrum reserved for one or multiple wholesale networks, owned by other than current mobile network operators.

**The Concept in Context**

ES48. The concept of independent third party mobile broadband networks is not new and is gaining traction as governments increasingly realize the urgency of ensuring that every one of their citizens have universal access to the best possible mobile connectivity as soon as possible.

**Implementation Proposal**

ES49. A significant portion of all upcoming spectrum awards should be reserved for independent third party 5G networks that would be required to offer wholesale services to anyone else including MNOs, MVNOs and other third parties. These new wholesale networks would also be able to offer retail services in their home areas to ensure it can have a successful business case.

ES50. The approach would not only accelerate the development of 5G networks everywhere across Canada but also, and most importantly, provide for an opportunity to deploy capital from new private sector sources, other than current
MNOs who have not seen it to be in their best interest to deploy in rural and remote areas and to open up their networks to other innovators in terms of mobile broadband services.

ES51. VMedia does not advocate for a state-owned 5G network in Canada. Structural separation on the other hand would be ideal, and while VMedia is strongly in favour of it, pragmatism reigns, and the focus should be on the doable.

ES52. We propose that a minimum of 30-35% of all future spectrum awards in all bands starting in the 3.5 GHz band be awarded on this basis. These networks would then be only focused on providing wholesale services to any service provider within a given area for any kind of fixed or mobile 5G service. Ensuring access to multiple spectrum bands suitable for 5G would be a necessity to ensure a viable business case for these new networks.

ES53. The builders of these independent wholesale networks would need to be totally independent of any of the current MNOs operating in Canada. This would ensure that all Canadian and foreign innovators could get access to 5G networks on which to offer their services to the benefit of all, without risk of conflict of interest on the part of the wholesale network provider.

\textit{Alternative Wholesale Network Solution}

\textit{A New Spectrum Set-Aside Approach}

ES54. Consistent with a re-alignment of focus from promoting facilities-based competition to promoting competition, while still preserving incentives to invest in new infrastructure, ISED should consider changing the way spectrum set-asides work.

ES55. Under this proposal, there should still be a spectrum set-aside, but with the following conditions:

a. Any carrier should be permitted to bid on the set-aside spectrum. This would still allow the government, and indirectly the Canadian public, to obtain top dollar for this valuable public resource;

b. The winning bidder(s) must use 50% of the set-aside spectrum for the provision of wholesale services to unaffiliated non-carriers (e.g., MVNOs) and carriers not otherwise operating in the Canadian wireless market as of the date of the license issuance (“new wireless carriers”);

c. The set-aside spectrum cannot be deployed unless it is deployed simultaneously for both the licensees own use, and for the use by wholesale customers (i.e., no head start); and
The spectrum licensee must abide by the rulings of a specialized tribunal appointed to resolve technical and commercial issues related to use of the spectrum by any such MVNO or new-wireless carrier, where the prime mandate of the tribunal would be the promotion of competition.

ES56. While the price of such access may make it difficult for new operators and licensees of the set-aside spectrum to reach a wholesale agreement, ultimately the licensee would be faced with the need to get a deal done, or risk not being able to deploy the set-aside spectrum it acquired for its own purposes. This would help offset some of the unequal bargaining power in a wholesale relationship.

**Any Approach is Better For Canadians than The Status Quo**

ES57. The proposed approaches would lower the barrier to entry for spectrum, enabling new players to actively participate in this market, in a model geared to generating virtually market-driven wholesale rates, reducing the need for constant monitoring by regulators.

ES58. This would ensure that the future 5G market in Canada is not totally controlled by the current oligopoly, a state of affairs which is expected to occur if the Canadian government does not take corrective action as soon as possible.

ES59. In any event, whatever structural changes might be considered, VMedia strongly urges the immediate implementation of a wireless framework permitting MVNOs to offer the choices and fair prices that Canadians deserve.

ES60. An MVNO framework, with the improvements to analogous processes suggested in connection with ISPs in this submission, would inevitably be to the benefit of Canadians, providing instant relief until a more comprehensive restructuring of the existing framework, in conjunction with the introduction of 5G, can be implemented.

*VMedia takes this opportunity to acknowledge and express its appreciation for the assistance of its own panel of experts, including Ed Antecol, Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, and others.*
The Submission

The Review

1. The issues outlined in the terms of reference and the themes described by the panel appointed by ISED to review the relevant legislation (the “Panel”) are extensive. There are seven terms of reference relating to issues to consider in connection with the Telecommunications and Radiocommunication Acts, and eight in connection with the Broadcasting Act. In addition, there are four themes set out by the Panel intended to “help guide its work and structure meaningful dialogue during its consultation process”.

2. Among those 19 elements of consideration, we note that the word competition is mentioned only twice, with little elaboration or context.

3. As the second point under both the Telecommunications and Radiocommunication Acts, under the heading “Competition, Innovation, and Affordability”, the question is asked, “Are legislative changes warranted to better promote competition, innovation and affordability?”

4. In addition, competition is mentioned at the very end of the first of the Panel’s themes, “Reducing Barriers to Access by All Canadian to Advanced Telecommunications Networks”. All of the rest of that theme focuses on the achievements of telephone and cable companies, and the heavy lifting ahead of them as they keep up with digital transformation.

5. There is no mention at all of competition in the terms of reference relating to the Broadcasting Act.

6. Similarly, regarding consideration of (i) Canadians as consumers of those services, who collectively pay nearly $45 billion per year for those services to a very small number of providers, and (ii) the need for a close examination of whether they are being served well, at reasonable prices, compared to other industrialized nations, there is very little.

7. This absence of focus on competition, with no acknowledgement whatsoever of the problematic state of consumer choice in services and competition, and the entitlement of consumers to a competitive market in the provision of services which are not just essential, but absolutely and increasingly central to their everyday lives, is disappointing.

8. Since at least 2008 the telecommunications industry has been in a constant state of upheaval as policymakers have sought to expand the availability of internet services beyond the incumbent telecom and cable duopolies that overwhelmingly dominate the market; leading to a virtual consumer revolt in 2011 when incumbents tried to
universally impose low usage caps unconscionably costly incremental usage fees on Canadians, just as the video streaming revolution was beginning to unfold.

9. Similarly in the case of mobile services, for years governments and policymakers, including the Minister of ISED\(^1\), have acknowledged that Canadians have been ill-served by the incumbents, persistently ranking among the lowest of 35 OECD countries in mobile usage and highest in cost of services. Indeed, a recent study ranks Canada near to dead last in gigabyte (“GB”) of data per dollar on mobile services.\(^2\)

10. The study considered the number of GB that the equivalent of €30 buys in different countries. In many countries, €30 buys unlimited GB, in the UK and France it buys 100 GB, in the US 10 GB, but in Canada only 2 GB.

11. Despite the best intentions of regulators and policymakers, the existing framework has not been conducive to dealing with the competitive problems that beset the Canadian telecommunications market in a meaningful way and providing consumers with better value and real alternatives.

12. A great deal of time and immense economic resources have been spent on trying to achieve a way forward that will resolve this, and while some progress has been made, a competitive market for mobile services is non-existent. While the choices

\(^1\) Speech, The Honourable Navdeep Bains, PC, MP Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Toronto, Ontario June 5, 2017  

in broadband services offered by competitive internet service providers has had an impact, that segment’s future remains fragile, threatened by the limitation of its access to new carriage platforms such as fibre to the premises and 5G.

13. For these reasons, VMedia urges that the reexamination of the limitations of the existing framework in providing meaningful competitive services be given far greater prominence in the proceedings conducted by the Panel going forward.

**Recommendation:** VMedia’s central comment is to urge the Panel to review its themes, and add to them the consideration specifically of whether Canadian consumers are well-served by the current regulatory framework, which has permitted a level of concentration in the telecom and broadcasting industries virtually unparalleled in the industrialized world.

14. VMedia will focus its detailed comments below on those elements of the terms of reference, and the themes articulated by the Panel, relating to competition, and providing competitive services for Canadian consumers.

15. In doing so, our proposals regarding wireless services, in particular our detailed comments regarding the introduction of 5G, will respond to the theme of “Reducing barriers to access by all Canadians to advanced telecommunications networks”. That discussion below proposes solutions for enabling innovators and new enterprises to gain access to spectrum resources as well as mobile broadband network resources. These are the key barriers currently inhibiting innovation and affordable services in the Canadian mobile market and will continue to be so in a 5G world, if no corrective action is taken now. Ensuring new access to spectrum and mobile broadband network resources is critical if Canada wants to ensure the creation of a vibrant and strong 5G environment in support of the digital Gig economy of the future.

**The Economic Interests of Consumers**

16. The lack of focus on competition and the entitlement of consumers to world-leading, rather than world-lagging, telecommunications services, is particularly relevant because telecommunications (and broadcasting) services comprise the fourth largest household expenditure after shelter, food and transportation.

17. Yet, unlike those needs, which are met by a myriad of competing suppliers ensuring fair pricing disciplined by market forces, telecom in each of the markets across Canada has always been and still is today largely a duopoly, dominated by a total of five major incumbents operating in pairs in the markets across the country.
18. Three of them account for 92% of mobile revenues, a market share that is steadily increasing. One of the three focuses primarily on the Quebec market, leaving much of the rest of the country to be served by the other two major providers.3

19. Five incumbents account for 87% of fixed internet revenues, but that does not suggest that the five compete against each other.4 In fact there are only two providers in any given market, a cable and a telecom provider, and that duopoly more typically shares that 87% of the market it serves.

20. In 2016, a year in which wage growth was 0.4%,5 and the Consumer Price Index barely budged6, average household mobile and internet expenditures, paid to those few providers, rose 5.5% and 6.5% respectively.

21. In that same year, the lowest quintile of Canadian households, those with less than $32,090 of household income, spent 8.6% of their annual income on communications services, and the lowest three quintiles, those making under $85,336 per year, including a good portion of Canada’s middle class, spent an average of 6% - and substantially more than that if measured in terms of after tax, disposable income.7

22. In the meantime, in addition to being near to most expensive in terms of cost per GB as shown above, Canada has achieved the dubious distinctions of ranking 30th among 35 OECD nations in mobile data usage, and sixth to last in the same group in mobile data subscriptions8.

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3 Communications Monitoring Report, 2018

4 Ibid. P. 5

5 Statistics Canada, The Daily, Payroll employment, Earnings and Hours, September 2016,
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/171130/cg-b001-eng.htm


7 Communications Monitoring Report, 2018, ii. What Communications Services do Canadian Households use,

8 OECD, Fixed and wireless broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (Dec. 2017),
23. This is no surprise, as even a recent study commissioned by ISED itself (the “Wall Report”) shows that Canadian wireless rates generally are among the highest in the world\(^9\), and by some accounts that gap is widening\(^10\).

24. The Wall Report, as discouraging as it is, has certain methodological shortcomings that understate the scale of the divergence between Canada and those other markets, and the even greater disadvantage to Canadian consumers.

25. At page vi of that report, prices for mobile services in Canada are shown as being comparable to prices in the US and Japan, but are double or more relative to prices in other countries (Australia, UK, France, Italy, Germany). The Wall Report, however, focuses only on service packages with limited usage included and does not reflect unlimited packages seen elsewhere or other features distinguishing services such as roaming.

26. Unlimited mobile data usage is important in the marketplace as it provides subscribers with a worry-free way to remain continuously connected, and connectedness is a key benefit of mobile data usage.

27. Unlimited mobile data usage supports economic development both by development of applications that take advantage of connectedness (e.g. Uber) and by improving immediacy of communications in daily life, whether for business, security, home monitoring, or other applications.

28. Moreover, the growing availability of high-resolution video content for mobile devices encourages heavy data usage by consumers. Sadly, in Canada, the

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availability of sports and other content on mobile is not a benefit to consumers, but a lure designed to create data junkies, who will be a growing source of lucrative data overage fees.

29. The following table provides a summary of mobile plans compiled in January 2019 in Canada, the US, UK and France, focusing on large and unlimited data usage plans. It reflects the far more dramatic actual differences between Canada and other countries than can be found in the Wall Report.

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<th>Canada</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>France</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TELUS</strong></td>
<td>Rogers</td>
<td>Bell</td>
<td>T Mobile</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
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<td>Includes international roaming in</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>210 countries</td>
<td>Europe (up to 15 GB)</td>
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<td>Roaming add-on (per day)</td>
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<td>$7</td>
<td>$8</td>
<td>$5</td>
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**Notes:**
- Rates include unlimited talk/text, connection lines, sales tax, converted to Canadian $ and PPP rates per IMF at October 2018.
- Canadian rates are for Ontario. UK prices are increased by retail price index (RPI) % each year.
- Freedom 20 GB plan is for on-network usage - usage off-network elsewhere in Canada is limited to 3 GB.
- T Mobile and Verizon rates are for single line; rates are lower for subscribing to multi-line lines. Verizon adds on USF and regulatory charges that vary by state and line type.
- T Mobile unlimited data plan and T Mobile unlimited data plan connection rate 5 GB; Verizon unlimited data plan connection rate 75 GB. Freedom slowed after plan usage exceeded.
- Free unlimited in France for Freedom subscribers - other subscribers are capped at 100 GB.
- Overage charges for Bell are $10 per GB, so using an additional 60 GB to match TELUS or Rogers included usage would cost $600. Unlimited plans are increasingly common in other countries, and in fact generally come at a lower subscription cost per month than capped plans do in Canada.

30. Importantly there are no unlimited mobile data plans in Canada at all. TELUS and Rogers have large plans including 80 GB, available for nearly $500 per month, however Bell and Freedom are capped at 20 GB. For a two-year contract, Freedom provides a 100 GB bonus, i.e. the equivalent of about 4 GB per month extra. Overage charges for Bell are $10 per GB, so using an additional 60 GB to match TELUS or Rogers included usage would cost $600. Unlimited plans are increasingly common in other countries, and in fact generally come at a lower subscription cost per month than capped plans do in Canada.

31. Canada lacks a price leader similar to T Mobile in the US, 3 UK or Free in France. While Freedom, a new entrant, provides a similar level of usage to that of Bell for half the price, Freedom restricts usage at this price to use in areas where it has its own network. Usage outside of Freedom’s own network is limited to 10% of the

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11 Sourced from Company websites on January 10, 2019:
- [https://www.bell.ca/Mobility/Cell_phone_plans/Share_plans](https://www.bell.ca/Mobility/Cell_phone_plans/Share_plans)
- [https://www.freedommobile.ca/plans-and-devices/plans](https://www.freedommobile.ca/plans-and-devices/plans)
- [https://www.verizonwireless.com/plans/unlimited/](https://www.verizonwireless.com/plans/unlimited/)
- [http://www.three.co.uk/Store/SIM/Plans_for_phones](http://www.three.co.uk/Store/SIM/Plans_for_phones)
- [https://shop.ee.co.uk/sim-only/pay-monthly-phones](https://shop.ee.co.uk/sim-only/pay-monthly-phones)
- [https://boutique.orange.fr/mobile/forfaits-orange](https://boutique.orange.fr/mobile/forfaits-orange)
- [http://mobile.free.fr](http://mobile.free.fr)

For comparative analysis, currencies all converted to USD at PPP rates estimated by IMF at October 2018: [https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPEX@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD](https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPEX@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD), and then converted to Canadian using PPP conversion from USD.
usage in the plan. Freedom is hampered by the need to pay high roaming charges to the incumbent operators in areas where Freedom has not yet deployed its own network.

32. Canadian packages including international data roaming focus only on the US. T Mobile US includes roaming to 210 countries, 3 UK to 71 countries and Free to 50 countries (although only at 3G speeds). Even with a plan including roaming, Canadian consumers have to pay extra – in the range of $12 per day – to use their data elsewhere than in the US. For an international traveler, this adds a significant cost to an already high monthly subscription.

33. Canada’s largest plans are smaller than those offered elsewhere and are more expensive. For example, an 80 GB plan on TELUS or Rogers in Canada comes with a subscription cost of almost $500 per month. This is five times the equivalent amount charged by Orange – the large incumbent operator in France – for almost twice as much usage. Similarly, EE in the UK provides 60 GB in its largest package – three times that of Bell in Canada – for about one quarter of the price charged by Bell. On a per GB basis, prices in Canada are 9 to 10 times higher.

34. In short, Canada lacks the benefits of the most basic market dynamics that operate elsewhere, resulting in exorbitant prices for Canadian consumers.

35. The differences can be seen more starkly in the graphic below. All of the prices shown outside of Canada are considerably lower than Canadian prices for unlimited packages as well as for large, but limited, usage plans. The exception in Canada, as noted above, is Freedom Mobile, with a comparable “sticker price” offer to that of Verizon US or Orange France. However, Freedom’s data usage is limited to areas of Canada where Freedom has its own network (primarily BC, Alberta and Ontario).
36. It is especially important that there be a greater focus on the economic experience of consumers in view of the impending introduction of 5G. A particular examination should be undertaken as part of the Panel’s process going forward to consider how the introduction of 5G should be managed.

37. This represents an opportunity to reconsider its deployment in the context of how best to ensure that consumers can benefit from a competitive and dynamic market in the retail supply of 5G services.

38. Moreover, given the wide ranging impact that 5G is predicted to have on the lives of all Canadians, predicted to be a central element not just in how we communicate with each other, but how we live our everyday lives, it is even more important to consider whether such a resource should be concentrated in the hands of incumbent duopolies. VMedia will provide additional comments in this regard below.

**Competence in Broadband Fixed Internet**

39. In the Wall Report it was shown that Canada also lags in the pricing of fixed internet. But in this case there are competitors, in the form of independent internet service providers (“ISPs”) such as VMedia, which purchase wholesale access to incumbent facilities to offer them at retail prices competitive with the incumbents. VMedia and other ISPs pay substantial tariffs for such access, calculated through rigorous costing processes conducted by the CRTC to ensure that all of the costs of the incumbents associated with such access are covered as well as a substantial mark up.

40. Even so, ISPs are able to offer internet plans virtually identical to those offered by the incumbents for prices 12.5% to 35% lower. Indeed ISPs have played a crucial role in introducing some small degree of pricing discipline, despite the fact that public awareness of the alternatives that ISPs represent is limited by ISPs’ resources, which are dwarfed by incumbent brand histories and marketing budgets.

41. The following table provides a summary of fixed broadband service plans compiled in January 2019 in Canada, the US, UK and France, focusing on the highest speed available and including unlimited data usage.

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12 Price Comparisons…, Section 5.3
13 Ibid., Section 5.2
42. There are distinctions between Canada and other countries that can be seen in the above table:

   a. With some exceptions, Canadian plans are more expensive per month than prices seen elsewhere. Prices are higher than comparable plans in the US and much higher than in France. Prices are lower in the UK than they are in Canada, but service speed is not comparable.

   b. Where available service speeds are much higher, notably in France, prices are much lower than in Canada, less than half. And while the Canadian price is for broadband only, the prices in France include other services (for Free, telephony, and for Orange, telephony and television).

   c. In Canada, bundles are expensive. In France, where Free has changed the competitive dynamics, consumers benefit not just from lower broadband prices, but from the inclusion of other services in the package. In Canada, including other services in a “bundle” increases costs substantially. In the case of Rogers, adding television and phone increases the price by approximately $50 per month, almost 40% more. Adding television to the Bell broadband price results in a similar increase, however since Bell shares capacity between television, phone and Internet, the max speed provided for Internet is then only 100 Mbps rather than 1.5 Gbps.

43. While the above represents only a limited set of comparable cases, the distinction between the UK and France shows the benefits to consumers of competition. In France, Free is a market disrupter and offers very high-speed service at an aggressive price. Orange, the large incumbent follows suit.

44. High speeds bring economic benefits in the form of greater usage and access to key services (e.g. government online services), use of e-commerce and promotion of home-based business. The following chart considers only the packages at Gigabit per second (Gbps) speed included above, being the ones with the greatest socio-

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPEX@WEO/OECD/ADVEC/WEOWORLD, and then converted to Canadian using PPP conversion from USD.
economic benefit. Excluding the outlying Comcast 2 Gbps service, Canada is at about a 20% disadvantage relative to the US, and over 100% relative to France.

45. The Review is being undertaken at a crucial juncture. Competition in broadband services has been a policy objective for governments led by both major parties for nearly two decades. In that time, the dominance of the cable and telecom duopolies in each market has been undiminished, with ISPs achieving less than 13% market share (and much less in the broadcasting distribution vertical, which some, like VMedia, have recently begun to offer). However, the efforts and innovations of ISPs have had a profound impact on consumers’ broadband service experience and prices.

46. This has been achieved despite:

   a. a tariff pricing framework that is not reflective of actual costs, nor transparent,

   b. ongoing efforts by incumbents to destabilize, undermine and ultimately eliminate the ISP sector, to allow them to continue their economic exploitation of Canadian consumers, and

   c. the resultant stifling of innovation which has made Canada an outlier among developed nations in broadband services and enabling the digital economy
The Role of ISPs

47. Despite uneconomic and arbitrary tariffs imposed on ISPs through consistently problematic costing processes, ISPs have been able to offer services identical or superior to those of the incumbents to Canadians at prices as much as 50% lower.

48. This is because incumbents generate margins of up to 90% on internet services, while ISPs have made do on margins as low as 25%. That delta represents economically unjustifiable tariffs, which serve as a proxy for purportedly just and reasonable wholesale prices.

49. ISPs have in this way introduced not just a competitive product but also market-pricing discipline, which incumbents, operating as a duopoly in all markets across Canada, would not otherwise be subject to.

50. In addition, ISPs have introduced innovative product offerings. ISPs were the first to introduce unlimited broadband packages, doing away with artificial data usage caps, a notable innovation of the incumbents that allowed them to impose exorbitant overage charges on top of already high monthly rates, charges that had no relationship to underlying costs - presaging current practices with mobile data overage charges.

51. More importantly, those data caps imposed severe limitations on the way in which consumers could interact with and enjoy all of the benefits of high-speed internet services, not the least of which is the internet as a video content transmission platform.

52. It was the ISPs' introduction of unlimited packages over 10 years ago, responding to the already growing demand for video content over the internet, that led to the usage-based billing controversy of 2011 and the accompanying consumer revolt.

53. The controversy arose when incumbents sought to force ISPs to impose the same data cap framework on consumers that the incumbents did, to ensure incumbents could continue doing so. An incumbent went so far as to characterize anyone who needed more than 25GBs per month of usage as "bandwidth hogs" and "pirates". Today the same incumbent touts 1Gbps service speed, with the accompanying flood of data, as essential to enable Canadians to fully enjoy the internet, and unlimited packages are the norm.

54. This transformation of the market, and the concomitant benefits to consumers, would not have happened without the influence of ISPs and their truly market-based and customer-driven approach to internet.

55. These benefits have been delivered within a framework that results in an inconsistent regulatory approach. The framework is intended to implement a policy that nurtures the formation and growth of the ISP sector. It has instead resulted in policies and tariff procedures, and an administrative regime intended to regulate the behavior of incumbents, that has largely left ISPs vulnerable to persistent efforts of incumbents to prevent new entities from forming, and to put existing ones out of business.

56. This instability has also made it near impossible for ISPs to raise capital, further weakening their ability to be a meaningful and longstanding competitive force.

**The Present Crisis**

57. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, ISPs have managed to survive, and continue to provide direct and indirect benefits to Canadian consumers. However, ISPs currently face yet another existential crisis in the form of a new regulatory policy (the “FTTP Access Policy”) which mandates the granting to ISPs of access to new fibre to the premises (“FTTP”) networks being rolled out by the incumbents.\(^{16}\)

58. The crisis ISPs face has two elements, one long term, the other short term.

59. In the long term, the ability of ISPs to be able to fund their access to FTTP facilities, under the new disaggregated framework contained in the FTTP Access Policy, is questionable at best. The time frame for the implementation of the disaggregated framework, largely dependent on the incumbents’ timing, has provided and will continue to provide an insurmountable head start for the incumbents in grabbing market share that will be difficult for ISPs to meaningfully penetrate.

60. Moreover, the requirements of the FTTP Access Policy that ISPs build out to the many points of connection that the disaggregated model requires are animated by a desire to have facilities built by ISPs, in an acknowledgement of the mandate to encourage facilities development in the Policy Direction of 2006\(^{17}\) (the “Policy Direction”).

61. In the short term, and after a lengthy process marked yet again by extensive delays by the incumbents, the CRTC initiated an interim tariff proceeding for accessing incumbent fibre pending the implementation of that disaggregated framework.

62. Finally, on August 29, 2017, pursuant to repeated efforts by the Canadian Network Operators Consortium (“CNOC”), the most relevant of which accompanies this submission as Exhibit 1 (and which itself is a compelling illustration of the cumbersome nature of the process itself, despite the fact that it was administered by the most consumer-activist CRTC in memory), the CRTC issued an order\(^{18}\)

\(^{16}\) Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2015-326  
\(^{17}\) Order Issuing a Direction to the CRTC on Implementing the Canadian Telecommunications Policy Objectives  
\(^{18}\) Telecom Order CRTC 2017-312
setting interim tariffs, and thereby granting interim access to FTTP facilities – a full two years after the setting of the FTTP Access Policy.

63. During this delay, more and more fibre had been (and continues to be) installed across an expanding urban footprint, significantly increasing the localized monopolies that sprout up with each FTTP-served building and neighbourhood.

64. The delay itself was an illustration of how problematic the framework in ensuring continued competition in residential broadband services. But even more problematic are the tariffs set by the CRTC.

65. For example, the interim approved monthly FTTP wholesale access rate for one telecom incumbent was set at, and remains, $121.79. Per month. Per home. This, when the highest retail price that incumbent quotes as at today’s date for 1Gbps service is $104.95.

66. This result is incomprehensible, especially when in another context, former Chairman Blais said:

“Competitors that provide retail Internet services to Canadians using wholesale high-speed services must have access to these services at just and reasonable prices. The fact that these large companies did not respect accepted costing principles and methodologies is very disturbing. What’s even more concerning is the fact that Canadians’ access to a choice of broadband Internet services would have been at stake had we not revised these rates. As always, we strive to create a dynamic competitive telecommunications market for Canadians.”

67. It is beyond the scope of this submission to provide a costing analysis to show that the tariff is not just and reasonable. It has been very difficult historically to respond to incumbent costing studies since key elements are only available to the CRTC, and redacted from public filings, making it impossible for VMedia, CNOC or anyone else to fully refute costing claims.

68. As disconnected as the tariff is to that incumbent’s highest retail price, it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile this tariff with the publicly available information as to the cost of FTTP rollouts to homes by that incumbent.

69. Taking the announced cost ($1.4 billion), and footprint (1.1 million homes), the investment comes to $1,270 per home. Based on the tariff, the incumbent is now able to recover the cost of its investment from ISPs within 10 months. After that period, its “wholesale” rate to ISPs will be 100% margin.

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70. At the same time, the incumbent is offering services to newly installed buildings. The offer is for 1 Gbps speed broadband, plus a middle level TV package, and premium movie channels, plus plus plus, for as low as $62 per month, with the price guaranteed for five years. There is no doubt that this is a good deal for consumers. There is also no doubt that there can be no relationship between the incumbent’s actual costs for FTTP facilities, and the tariff set by the CRTC, at least not one which would suggest that the tariff is “just and reasonable”. The incumbent is clearly far better off selling to ISPs wholesale than to the public retail.

71. The benefit to consumers would of course be short-lived, because if these disparities between tariffs and retail prices are permitted to prevail, there will be no ISP alternative for consumers, only the dominance of a duopoly which governments have sought to restrict and reduce for two decades.

72. In the event, in November 2018 CNOC filed a review and vary application\(^\text{21}\) (the “CNOC Application”) with the CRTC, asking that it reconsider the FTTP Access Policy. The substance of the application is that, as structured, the FTTP Access Policy makes it impossible for ISPs to participate in such a way that they can continue to serve their existing markets and survive. At best, small pockets of markets in dense urban areas might have the benefit of the competitive alternative that ISPs offer but the vast majority of the Canadian market will be left to manage with a duopoly regime.

73. The CNOC Application does however highlight the unintended consequence of the FTTP Access Policy’s adherence to the Policy Direction. In S.1(c)(ii) the Policy Direction orders the CRTC to pursue policy objectives of the Telecommunications Act “with a view to increasing incentives for innovation in and construction of competing telecommunications network facilities”. As structured, the FTTP Access Policy creates no incentive whatsoever for ISPs to do any such thing.

74. Even worse, if the FTTP Access Policy remains unamended, it will result in the virtual elimination of the competitive forces which the Policy Direction was intended to encourage.

75. The argument that underpins the facilities requirement in S.1(c)(ii), that competition generated by granting access to incumbent facilities will inhibit investment by incumbents, has never been proven to be valid in the Canadian or US context. The need to compete with the duopoly competitor in terms of facilities far outstrips the possible minimal market loss that may go to non-facilities based competitors.

76. However, that requirement has inhibited the ability of regulators to fully focus on the encouragement of competitive services to provide more choice and better prices and service levels to Canadian consumers. VMedia believes that FTTP Access Policy, and its requirement that ISPs invest heavily, and beyond their means, in facilities, was the result of the Commission’s adherence to the requirement.

\(^{21}\) CRTC Reference 8662-C182-201809534
77. If S.1( c)(ii) were in place in when there was the move to introduce competition into the long distance market, Canadians would still be paying multiple dollars per minute for calls between Toronto and Montreal, instead of the virtual pennies they pay today. Competition was introduced without duplicative facilities, and the incumbents continued to prosper. In the meantime the direct economic benefits and enhancements in productivity through cheaper long distance communications is incalculable.

78. The Policy Direction is commendable insofar as it provides imperatives to promote competition. But the requirement that consideration be given to the creation of additional facilities is flawed. Firstly, the prime objective of the Policy Direction, for good reason given the imperatives of encouraging competition as referenced above, is to do exactly that. Competition is a valid end in itself, and if it can be achieved without building out additional facilities, then that requirement should not be a consideration.

79. Second, there is no greater good served in building redundant facilities. The legacy benefits of the incumbents can never be matched by new market entrants, and if existing facilities can be used to generate multiple choices for consumers, while fairly treating the owner of those existing facilities that should be the way forward.

**Recommendation:** For these reasons VMedia recommends that the Policy Direction be immediately amended to remove the requirement that the CRTC be required to consider the investment in and construction of competing telecommunications network facilities in implementing the policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Telecommunications Act.

**A Flawed Tariff Framework**

80. The FTTP Access Policy is not the first time that costing process outcomes have lacked justification. In 2011, as a means of resolving the usage based billing controversy, the CRTC set tariffs for wholesale access which included a usage component, in addition to fixed access charges. The usage component measured capacity needs of ISPs, and resulted in a capacity based billing element, measured in megabits, which was added to the fixed portion.

81. What was remarkable about the tariffs was that the cost per megabit awarded to each incumbent varied wildly, not just between telecom and cable facilities providers but between incumbents within those verticals as well. For example, Bell was granted $22.13 per Mb (shortly afterwards reduced to $11.40 after lengthy review and vary proceedings, and then pursuant to a later proceeding, in October 2016, to $1.49) while MTS was awarded $2.81. Rogers was granted $12.51 while Cogeco was given $26.95.

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22 Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-703
23 Telecom Order CRTC 2016-396
82. The wide range cast doubt on the validity and accuracy of the cost data provided by the incumbents. As a senior Rogers executive commented at that time on the rates:

‘The executive said Rogers was “puzzled” by the disparity between its rates and those at other cable companies.

“Normally, rates would be within a dollar or so of each other, which kind of makes sense,” he said. “We have very similar networks, very similar customers and we operate in very similar territories.”’

83. These outcomes do not reflect a reliable costing process. They never have. To give effect to policies set by successive Federal cabinets, an alternative to the existing framework is needed to ensure just and reasonable rates, not tariffs which defy common sense.

84. VMedia believes that costing processes have shown themselves to be obstacles to the development of a robust and stable competitive market.

85. Moreover, the tariff framework allows incumbents to dramatically undercut ISP pricing, knowing full well the prices paid by ISPs to them for identical services. This is an insidious form of predatory pricing, as it is the ISP’s supplier that is trying to force the ISP, the customer, out of business.

86. The argument that an incumbent is offering services at below-tariff promo pricing, to take market share from other incumbents, is clearly refuted by the incumbent’s own actions. Recent examples (see Exhibit 2) with incumbent flanker brands have in some cases explicitly targeted ISP competitors, asking the consumer to compare the incumbent flanker brand price with that of a well-known ISP.

87. Given the tariff set for the ISP, responding without going out of business quickly is impossible. Failing to respond assures that the ISP will go out of business slowly. But in either case the ISP segment cannot survive in the long term.

88. The uncertainty in wholesale access tariff costing processes should be eliminated. Mindful of the fact that the margin over costs of facilities is 90%, an assumption should be made as to what is a reasonable ongoing fixed wholesale price for access, set as a percentage of the retail price set by the incumbent.

**Recommendation:** Attached as Schedule A is a chart showing the historical percentage that tariffs for particular internet plans are of the retail prices that the incumbents charge for comparable plans. VMedia recommends that tariffs be fixed through a formulaic mechanism introduced

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24 business.financialpost.com/technology/small-internet-providers-seek-crtc-decision-reversal
through legislated changes to the Telecommunications Act, and updated every five years by regulation. That mechanism would specify that:

1. As a general rule, the tariff for any given internet plan shall not exceed 35% of the incumbent’s retail price for comparable plans.

2. Tariffs be set on that basis for all plans marketed by incumbents from time to time.

3. During periods that plans are subject to incumbent promotional pricing, if that promotional price is less than 65% of the posted retail price for that plan, tariffs shall be reduced to 35% of that promotional price so long as the promotion shall be in effect. This measure will discourage predatory pricing aimed at putting ISPs out of business.

4. Tariffs as reduced shall remain reduced for ISP subscribers who have signed up with ISPs with the benefit of a similar promotion, for the duration of the relevant promo period.

**Incumbent Efforts to Sabotage ISPs**

89. Since its formation in 2012 VMedia has experienced deliberate and concerted efforts by certain incumbents to prevent VMedia from launching, and then after it launched, to target and obliterate its business entirely. All of these tactics were either permitted within the regulatory framework, or if prohibited, the prohibitions were not accompanied by any practical, timely, or adequately punitive recourse.

90. Some of the attempts were related to telecom services, and others to broadcasting services. Since as an IPTV service provider they are inextricably connected, VMedia has referenced both categories.

**The Four Year Stall**

91. VMedia first requested a third party internet access (“TPIA”) arrangement with an incumbent in 2011. Regulations only prescribe a timetable for proceeding with a request for TPIA service once the process is underway. For example once an incumbent enters into an NDA, the clock starts to tick. However, there is no deadline stipulated for commencing the negotiation process.

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25 It should be noted that there is precedent for such an approach. It was applied to roaming charges under S.27.1 of the Telecommunications Act (since repealed).
92. The persistent delays in agreeing to begin negotiations went on for so long, that
VMedia could no longer afford to delay its launch. In the end, VMedia was forced to
enter into a resale arrangement with another ISP that had a TPIA deal with the
incumbent. This was of course at significantly greater cost reducing margins on that
product to almost nil and, moreover, added a layer of delay and complexity to the
installation process and troubleshooting since requests always had to go through
the intermediary, as VMedia had no contractual relationship with the incumbent.

93. Citing backlogs, blackouts, and inadequate resources the incumbent stalled
VMedia for nearly four years. Even once it agreed to enter into negotiations, and
start the prescribed clock, the incumbent imposed onerous security guarantee
requirements which delayed the launch for another year.

94. In the result, VMedia launched its direct TPIA service in May, 2016, after paying
an unnecessary and substantial mark up for the first three years in business. The
delay cost VMedia dearly in margin payments to the reseller, as well as considerable
market good will and loss of reputation due to the complexities of installing
customers and troubleshooting.

95. While VMedia had at all times the potential remedy of a Part 1 application, which if
successful could have compelled the incumbent to enter into a TPIA deal, such a
process would have been costly and lengthy, up to nine months or more to
completion.

96. The dealings with the incumbent throughout were such that with each delay,
VMedia had to weigh the length and cost of a Part 1 proceeding against the
possibility that the incumbent might actually come to the table in less time than the
proceeding would take to complete. Of course, if VMedia had known at the outset
that the delays would add up to nearly four years it would have chosen to turn to the
CRTC.

The TV Stall

97. In order to launch its BDU service, VMedia required an affiliate arrangement with
the major vertically integrated entities (“VIEs”). Without those deals with all of them,
VMedia could not launch its TV service.

98. In this case, too, one of the VIEs refused to enter into negotiations. Instead, it
delayed and delayed entering into an NDA, a prerequisite to sharing their rate card,
until VMedia provided a TV channel-packaging plan with retail prices. This of course
was impossible without the rate card. So VMedia went in circles with the VIE for over
a year, trying to push negotiations forward while facing the same choice between
hoping the eventual deal would come sooner cooperatively than through a more
adversarial process before the CRTC.
99. Finally, a deal was completed, allowing VMedia to launch its brand, with both internet and TV, in April 2013, a year and a half after its initial request for services.

100. It should be noted that the VIE framework (which in 2001 after decades of prohibition, began to allow carriage services like cable and telecom incumbents to acquire content providers such as TVA, CTVGlobeMedia and CanWest), has greatly contributed to the suffocating consolidation of market power in the hands of VIE incumbents, and given them even greater leverage over ISPs, independent BDUs and independent programming services alike.

101. All of the VIE interactions with independent players are uneconomic, and the VIE content assets are not exploited through maximizing their distribution as widely as possible through any and all paying distribution platforms, but by keeping those assets exclusive to themselves as much as possible, to help drive their carriage businesses, in particular internet and mobile.

102. Efforts like the Wholesale Code and undue preference provisions in the regulations are intended to manage anti-competitive behavior, but again, accessing such relief is enormously time-consuming and grievously costly for independents. More importantly, there are no punitive measures to discourage anti-competitive behavior, so independents are victims of ongoing skirmishes, delays and even efforts to eliminate competitors entirely, in a deliberate strategy to exploit the existing framework to reduce or eliminate competition.

103. Incumbents are not deterred from employing business practices which contravene the spirit and at times the language to the Acts, and regulations, resulting in a moral hazard that unduly impedes competition. The delays suffered by VMedia, which cost it many hundreds of thousands of dollars in unfunded overhead and additional costs paid to intermediaries, as well as a year and a half of first mover advantage in its space, went unpunished, and VMedia had no recourse for damages under the current framework, assuming VMedia could even have afforded the considerable fees involved in taking on some of the biggest companies in Canada.

104. The relationship between incumbents and ISPs is grossly asymmetrical, highlighted by the irreducible fact that the supplier of all of the ISPs’ goods and services is also a very deep-pocketed competitor that wants the ISP segment to disappear. This is not a complaint against the incumbents. They are acting with perfect economic logic, given the framework that defines the scope of its abilities to act.

105. It is the framework that must change. A process is required to provide a) expedited relief against any behavior by an incumbent that would not be reasonable for a bona fide supplier of goods and services acting in good faith with the intention of maximizing market revenues for those goods and services b) that costs of any process incurred by an ISP seeking to enforce its rights be borne by the incumbent.

26 Decision CRTC 2001-384
and c) that damages, both pecuniary and punitive, at the minimum sufficient to serve as a deterrent to such behavior, be payable by the incumbent.

**Recommendation:** VMedia, like all ISPs, has had experience with the Commission for Complaints for Telecom-Television Services ("CCTS"). The CCTS ensures that consumers have every opportunity, at no cost to them, to enforce their rights against telecom and television providers. It has extensive powers to investigate and adjudicate, and award damages. VMedia recommends a regime similar to the CCTS be created to adjudicated issues arising between ISPs and incumbents. This regime would provide, among other things:

a. for expedited relief against any behavior by an incumbent that would not be reasonable for a bona fide supplier of goods and services acting in good faith with the intention of maximizing market revenues for those goods and services;

b. that costs of any process incurred by an ISP seeking to enforce its rights be borne by the incumbent; and

c. that damages, both pecuniary and punitive, at the minimum sufficient to serve as a deterrent to such behavior, be payable by the incumbent.

**Competition in Mobile Services**

106. As shown above, there are currently no alternatives to the five mobile providers which dominate the market in Canada, 92% of which is shared among just three of them. While the Minister has made clear the Cabinet’s desire for more competition in the market, including the development of a framework which would allow mobile virtual networks operators ("MVNOs"), which are non-facilities based competitors that are available in abundance in many markets around the world, including the US, no steps have yet been taken in that direction.

107. The creation of MVNOs would introduce the potential for a similar form of competitive service as that provided by ISPs in the case of fixed internet, but if the pricing model followed a similar approach as with ISPs, and incumbents were permitted to obstruct, delay and even attempt to eliminate the segment, once created, MVNOs would clearly face the same precarious future.

108. Absent any other option, MVNOs would still be beneficial to Canadian consumers, in the same way ISPs have been able to moderate incumbent retail prices and plans, including the elimination of usage caps, a benefit Canadian clearly have yet to enjoy in the case of mobile, as we have shown above.
109. Faced with the introduction of 5G, which promises to greatly expand the importance of mobile services in the lives of all Canadians, it is important to consider how that technology can, at its inception, be made available in such a way that Canadians can feel secure that they have abundant choices, fair prices, excellent service and practices that place the highest value on their privacy and safety. In VMedia’s view, this can best be achieved through the creation of an independent wholesale 5G network.

*The Need for a Third Party Wholesale Network*

110. Many GHz of spectrum will be awarded for 5G mobile broadband services over the coming years, many times more than what has already been awarded since 1984, as regulators worldwide embark on a new wave of spectrum auctions focused on what is referred to as mid-band (e.g. 3.5 GHz) and mmWave spectrum bands.

111. For example, by year-end 2019, the FCC is expected to have awarded close to 5 GHz of new mobile broadband spectrum in each area across the USA. Canada will be doing the same albeit with a few years of delay based on current trends. In comparison, currently 632 MHz of commercial mobile spectrum has been awarded in total in Canada\(^27\). The next few years will see close to an eight-fold increase in spectrum to be awarded.

112. Given the current levels of competition, services and pricing for mobile services in Canada described above, VMedia urges the Canadian government to take the appropriate steps to ensure that this vast and valuable public resource – valuable not just economically but strategically, and crucial to enabling Canadians to innovate and compete globally - does not end up under the same dominant influence as we have demonstrated afflicts mobile services today.

113. It is an opportunity to ignite vibrant competition in wireless services, more investment by incumbents currently providing mobile services (mobile network operators or “MNOs”) and other segments of the private sector in mobile broadband networks in Canada, and moving Canada from the bottom ranks of OECD nations to the top.

114. To this end, VMedia proposes that all future spectrum awards in Canada, starting with the award for 3.5 GHz spectrum, include a significant amount of spectrum reserved for one or multiple wholesale networks, owned by other than current mobile network operators. A proposal on how this could be achieved and the associated rules set is provided below.

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The Concept in Context

115. The concept of independent third party mobile broadband networks is not new and is gaining traction as governments increasingly realize the urgency of ensuring that every one of their citizens have universal access to the best possible mobile connectivity as soon as possible.

116. In 2016, Mexico went ahead and established a process to award all of its 700 MHz spectrum to an independent third party, The Altan Consortium (“Altan”). The initiative is privately funded, and the member of Altan include the Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Group as well as Canada’s own Caisse de dépôt et Placements du Québec (CDPQ), which holds a 12.68% stake.

117. Referred to as a carriers’ carrier, Altan wholesales capacity to the various MNOs or other clients active in its market. The solution is a virtual structural separation of national wireless services, where all interested parties are encouraged to participate in the retail segment of the wireless industry and compete against each other in offering Mexicans the best service possible. Altan was awarded a 20-year concession with an option to extend for an additional 20 years.28 This network launched in March 2018.

118. More recently, the German ruling party has called for government action to ensure Germany can achieve “one of the best mobile phone networks in the world”29 and maintain its economic leadership. Members of the government have proposed that the state itself should build mobile towers to ensure they are no areas without coverage and to force MNOs to fulfill their obligations because “Every radio hole is an absurdity in a high-tech country like Germany.”30

Implementation Proposal

119. A significant portion of all upcoming spectrum awards should be reserved for independent third party 5G networks that would be required to offer wholesale services to anyone else including MNOs, MVNOs and other third parties. These new wholesale networks would also be able to offer retail services in their home areas to ensure it can have a successful business case.

120. The approach described below would not only accelerate the development of 5G networks everywhere across Canada but also, and most importantly, provide for an opportunity to deploy capital from new private sector sources, other than current MNOs who have not seen it to be in their best interest to deploy in rural and remote

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29 “German ruling party calls for state-owned infrastructure to push 5G networks”, January 4, 2019, Source: Xinhua
areas and to open up their networks to other innovators in terms of mobile broadband services.

121. We also highlight recent press coverage that the Canadian government is assessing options to bring private backers to help build better broadband connections in rural and remote areas. These high speed broadband “holes”, even more pernicious than German radio ones, can be sealed with the third party wholesale network approach we describe, in a quick and efficient manner.31

122. VMedia does not advocate for a state-owned 5G network in Canada. Structural separation would be ideal, and while VMedia is strongly in favour of it, pragmatism reigns, and the focus should be on the doable. These examples however illustrate the hunger for new solutions to ensure that all citizens participate in the coming enhancements to the everyday lives of those fortunate enough to be connected to the best available services, and the game changers that developed and developing countries increasingly feel the need to introduce.

123. Given Canada’s experience over the last 30 years, we respectfully submit that a different approach should also be part of ISED’s plan to ensure 5G connectivity across Canada is achieved quickly, and that this approach should be the urgent creation of a framework for the development of independent 5G third party wholesale networks.

124. This new approach should be reflected in the new legislation by adding stimulating innovation in services and access to networks on reasonable terms as objectives of a new Telecom Act.

125. We propose that a minimum of 30-35% of all future spectrum awards in all bands starting in the 3.5 GHz band be awarded on this basis. These networks would then be only focused on providing wholesale services to any service provider within a given area for any kind of fixed or mobile 5G service. Ensuring access to multiple spectrum bands suitable for 5G would be a necessity to ensure a viable business case for these new networks.

126. Reserving 30% to 35% of all spectrum for new wholesale networks would ensure that one or more of the current MNOs would also need to access these wholesale networks in order to continue enhancing their service offerings, thereby ensuring future revenues for the wholesale network.

127. VMedia believes that is critical to start this process with the 3.5 GHz spectrum band owing to its propagation characteristics, of the order of a few Kms, compared to mmWave spectrum, with an expected typical range of less than 1 Km. The 3.5 GHz will be required for the wholesale networks to establish a good coverage base for local 5G services now and in the future.

Award processes for wholesale networks should be conducted on a Tier 4 or Tier 5 basis to encourage local investment and innovation across all Canadian cities, large and small, as well as all rural and remote areas. Licensing should be done on a granular basis consistent with market requirements and the specific frequencies being licensed (e.g. very high frequencies provide limited geographic coverage and therefore can be licensed for very small areas). In the US, for example, the FCC has begun licensing frequencies for 5G on a county basis, of which there are over 3,000 across the country. Part of the objectives for licensing by county is to provide smaller and rural carriers with opportunities to fill “holes” in coverage areas not addressed by the large national carriers.

For the rural and remote areas, the many broadband funding initiatives introduced by ISED over the last 10 years or more provide ample demonstration that there are many types of companies, organizations, for profit or not, that are ready to build networks to ensure that their communities are served with better broadband services. We believe this continue to be encouraged to ensure that 5G services can be deployed in a timely manner everywhere and not only in urban areas.

The builders of these independent wholesale networks would need to be totally independent of any of the current MNOs operating in Canada. This would ensure that all Canadian and foreign innovators could get access to 5G networks on which to offer their services to the benefit of all, without risk of conflict of interest on the part of the wholesale network provider.

Ensuring Fair Pricing

The winning bidders in each region would be committed to aggressive build-out requirements with target deadlines after 3 years (e.g. 40% of population), after 5 years (60% of population) and after 10 years (e.g. 75% of population). Spectrum that would be still unused or not meet the 75% deployment requirement after 10 years would be returned to ISED for re-auction. This would ensure motivation to fill the pipes, and the only way that would be achieved would be with fair prices.

The licenses for this reserved spectrum should be awarded via a reverse auction process. This process would be separate from the auction for current MNOs in all future spectrum bands but should be conducted in parallel to ensure these wholesale networks can be deployed within a similar timeframe as the current MNOs.

The participants in the reverse auction would bid by committing to the lowest possible wholesale rate for mobile data, SMS and voice services across each service area they bid for. The starting point for bidding would be average of current tariffed roaming rates as provided by Canadian incumbents. Thus, in exchange for access to “free spectrum”, the winning organizations would be subjected to the obligation to provide wholesale services to anyone, without discrimination, and at
the lowest possible wholesale rates. Under such a framework, there would be no need for significant and constant regulatory intervention. The framework will regulate itself.

134. The winning organizations would be guaranteed to have non-discriminatory access to wholesale wireline services from all existing telecom carriers for its backhaul links and any interconnection requirements. In the context of the significant increases in access points which will be required for deployment of 5G in mmWave, government intervention may be required to ensure access to support structures as well as backhaul links if the current market for backhaul links, forborne from regulation, does not function satisfactorily. (This is a problem which ISPs will also face under the FTTP Access Policy, if it is implemented unamended).

135. For remote and rural areas, the winning consortium would have access to an initial network build-out subsidy up to pre-set percentage e.g. 50% of initial build out costs up, to a maximum amount per area. The rural and remote areas that include a subsidy in the maximum amount would be defined in advance of the reverse auction and be part of the information known to potential bidders.

136. The third party wholesale networks would be subject to the same wireless siting obligations as all MNOs and be able to co-locate with any other MNO.

137. The third party 5G wholesale networks would have equal access as that provided to current regional MNOs to roaming services from any of the current MNOs on terms and conditions that are identical to the tariffs put in place by the CRTC. The average of current tariffs would be a maximum price and lower prices could be offered by current MNOs. Current MNOs would also be required to wholesale international roaming services to the third party wholesale network operators at reasonable rates as well as terms and conditions.

**Alternative Wholesale Network Solution**

138. VMedia is not unaware of the scale of the changes proposed above. Any adoption of such a proposal by a government in Canada will be a result of a willingness to implement profound innovations to the manner in which wireless services are delivered to Canadians, and the assessment of the availability of the substantial financial resources from the private sector which would be required. These challenges have been understood and taken on, or are soon to be taken on, in other countries as shown above so it is not beyond our capabilities to do so.

139. However, the need for a change to the status quo is so profound that measures that are politically less challenging ought to also be considered. For this reason VMedia is proposing an alternative wholesale network approach that requires less innovation of the existing framework, and which may also satisfy the objectives outlined above.
A New Spectrum Set-Aside Approach

140. Consistent with a re-alignment of focus from promoting facilities-based competition to promoting competition, while still preserving incentives to invest in new infrastructure, ISED should consider changing the way spectrum set-asides work.

141. Today spectrum set-asides exist to allow almost anyone other than the three major MNOs that dominate the market, to bid on a portion of spectrum being auctioned off. The net result is a taxpayer gift to the strongest new entrants in each region of the country e.g., Shaw in BC, Alberta, and Southern Ontario, Videotron in Quebec, and Eastlink in the Maritime provinces, which can acquire spectrum at a lower price than the other incumbents that must compete openly for the remaining spectrum.

142. At some point, targeted taxpayer subsidies to those regional MNOs, to promote facilities-based competition by a fourth carrier, need to stop, and the focus needs to shift to promoting competition more broadly, with greater access to spectrum and networks made available to a wide range of potential retail service competitors. VMedia believes this can be achieved by the adoption of a new approach to spectrum set-asides.

143. Under this proposal, there should still be a spectrum set-aside, but with the following conditions:

   a. Any carrier should be permitted to bid on the set-aside spectrum. This would still allow the government, and indirectly the Canadian public, to obtain top dollar for this valuable public resource;

   b. The winning bidder(s) must use 50% of the set-aside spectrum for the provision of wholesale services to unaffiliated non-carriers (e.g., MVNOs) and carriers not otherwise operating in the Canadian wireless market as of the date of the license issuance (“new wireless carriers”);

   c. The set-aside spectrum cannot be deployed unless it is deployed simultaneously for both the licensees own use, and for the use by wholesale customers (i.e., no head start); and

   d. The spectrum licensee must abide by the rulings of a specialized tribunal appointed to resolve technical and commercial issues related to use of the spectrum by any such MVNO or new-wireless carrier, where the prime mandate of the tribunal would be the promotion of competition.

144. Ideally, the MVNOs and other new wireless carriers would want to access that portion of the licensees’ set-aside spectrum in a Multi-Operator Core Network (MOCN) configuration with aggregated access to the set-aside portion of the radio access network of the licensee.
145. While the price of such access may make it difficult for new operators and licensees of the set-aside spectrum to reach a wholesale agreement, ultimately the licensee would be faced with the need to get a deal done, or risk not being able to deploy the set-aside spectrum it acquired for its own purposes. This would help offset some of the unequal bargaining power in a wholesale relationship.

146. There would not be any material disincentive to invest in facilities under this approach. A wireless carrier could decide it was uninterested in wholesale customers, and therefore just bid on that portion of the spectrum that is unencumbered. On the other hand, a carrier may see an opportunity to acquire spectrum where half is sufficient for its needs, and earn additional wholesale revenues. Such a carrier would still make the same decisions as to where and when to deploy with the only constraint being that when they deploy, they must do so with at least one unaffiliated new MVNO/wireless carrier, and not discriminate against any potential interested party.

147. A strong wireless carrier like a national MNO would have an incentive to acquire set-aside spectrum for its own use, and derive wholesale revenue from the remaining paid-for, but otherwise unusable portion of the set-aside spectrum. This may well result in a market approach similar to that of Sprint in the US which actively encourages and supports wholesale customers.

148. Such an approach would increase competition for services into the home while not deterring future investments in 5G wireless infrastructure.

**Any Approach is Better For Canadians than The Status Quo**

149. VMedia believes that the approaches proposed herein to ensure wider access to spectrum, and the wireless market, by competitors, facilities-based or otherwise, across Canada would be not only beneficial but critical to making 5G a success for consumers and businesses alike, and Canada a leader worldwide. In our preferred independent wholesale network approach, many large and small organizations, for example ISPs currently operating across Canada, could become acquirers of 5G spectrum, enhancing network investment as well as competition across Canada.

150. The proposed approaches would lower the barrier to entry for spectrum, enabling new players to actively participate in this market, in a model geared to generating virtually market-driven wholesale rates, reducing the need for constant monitoring by regulators.

151. This would ensure that the future 5G market in Canada is not totally controlled by the current oligopoly, a state of affair which is expected to occur if the Canadian government does not take corrective action as soon as possible.
152. In any event, whatever structural changes might be considered, VMedia strongly urges the immediate implementation of a wireless framework permitting MVNOs to offer the choices and fair prices that Canadians deserve. VMedia acknowledges that the cost study processes underpinning tariffs in the fixed broadband segment are problematic, as set out above, but the existence of ISPs under that framework have provided some benefits to Canadians, so that market differences between Canada and other countries, while still unjustifiable, are not as stark.

153. An MVNO framework, with the improvements to analogous processes suggested in connection with ISPs in this submission, would inevitably be to the benefit of Canadians, providing instant relief until a more comprehensive restructuring of the existing framework, in conjunction with the introduction of 5G, can be implemented.

This completes VMedia’s comments. VMedia looks forward to the next stages of the Review process.
## Schedule A

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BEFORE THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION
AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF

AN APPLICATION BY CANADIAN NETWORK OPERATORS CONSORTIUM INC.
PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 24, 32 AND 47 OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
AND PART 1 OF THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

FOR TRANSITIONAL AGGREGATED WHOLESALE HIGH-SPEED ACCESS
SERVICES OVER INCUMBENT FIBRE-TO-THE-PREMISES FACILITIES

30 MARCH 2017
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES1. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps are occurring throughout Canada, wherever an Incumbent has deployed FTTP access facilities and there are no other wireline access facilities available from that Incumbent capable of providing high-speed Internet services. As a consequence, there are no wholesale HSA services available from that Incumbent over which Competitors are able to offer retail high-speed Internet services in these Wholesale HSA Service Gap. This situation is a result of the lengthy and still ongoing process to implement the Commission’s decision in TRP 2015-326 to link mandated wholesale access to FTTP access facilities with the future deployment of disaggregated wholesale HSA services.

ES2. The experience of CNOC members has shown that Wholesale HSA Service Gaps are becoming increasingly large and prevalent. These service gaps generally develop under three sets of conditions that have progressed significantly since the issuance of TRP 2015-326:

1) Greenfield FTTP deployments by an Incumbent where that Incumbent has only deployed FTTP access facilities over which wholesale HSA services cannot be provided;

2) Brownfield FTTP deployments by an Incumbent where the only wireline facilities available from that Incumbent to provide wholesale HSA services are legacy wireline facilities; and

3) Brownfield FTTP deployments by an Incumbent where that Incumbent has removed all of its previously existing wireline facilities over which wholesale HSA services could be provided.

ES3. Wherever Wholesale HSA Service Gaps exist, Competitors are foreclosed from offering competitive retail high-speed Internet services and Incumbents enjoy significant market power flowing from what are essentially localized monopolies over their high-speed access facilities and corresponding ability to offer retail high-speed Internet services over those facilities. The economic harms flowing from Wholesale HSA Service Gaps can last for years. Furthermore, the

1 Note: Capitalized terms in the Executive Summary not defined therein are defined in the body of the Intervention.
situation prevents Competitors from achieving demand conditions that are necessary to justify
investment in transport facilities and a transition to disaggregated services.

ES4. Consumers located in Wholesale HSA Service Gaps are deprived from the competitive
benefits flowing from wholesale service regulation and therefore suffer the greatest harm. Notably,
Wholesale HSA Service Gaps affect both Canadian consumers and businesses as they impact
single family dwellings, multi-dwelling units, as well as commercial and office buildings. In
addition, Wholesale HSA Service Gaps permeate Canadian residential and business communities
in both urban and suburban areas alike. For example, there are massive Brownfield FTTP
deployments throughout the Province of Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta as well
as Atlantic Canada and elsewhere in the country. Additionally, Greenfield deployments occur on
a constant basis from coast to coast. Data from the Commission’s Communications Monitoring
Reports also suggests that FTTP access facilities are being deployed in the absence of overlapping
FTTN access facilities.

ES5. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps run contrary to the Commission’s intentions with respect to
the Commission’s TRP 2015-326 transition plan, which explicitly states: “This transition plan will
serve to ensure that wholesale access to the access facilities required to provision downstream
retail services is always provided for.”

ES6. In order to eliminate Wholesale HSA Service Gaps and ensure that the transition to
disaggregated wholesale HSA services unfolds in accordance with the Commission’s intentions,
CNOC is requesting relief consisting of Transitional FTTP Access on an aggregated basis, as more
fully described in the body of the Application and summarized at paragraph 12.

ES7. There is a wealth of regulatory precedents for transitional wholesale access of the kind
requested by CNOC. Transitional FTTP Access fits squarely within the mold that the Commission
has applied as recently as November 2016, in TD 2016-446, which granted transitional access to
RCCI’s aggregated wholesale HSA services over FTTP access facilities. Other examples, include:
(1) the transitional wholesale cable resale that the Commission has consistently implemented,
including as recently as last year, pending the rollout of TPIA by a Cable Carrier; and (2) the
transitional FTTN-based wholesale HSA services regime implemented by the Commission in 2011
pending a determination on the final rates, terms and conditions relating to such services that was
issued later that year.
ES8. Overall, the case for Transitional FTTP Access is simple and straightforward. This relief is critical to ensure that the Commission’s transition plan to disaggregated wholesale HSA services unfolds as intended. To this end, Transitional FTTP Access will categorically eliminate existing and future Wholesale HSA Service Gaps, thereby ensuring that wholesale access is always provided for.

ES9. Approval of Transitional FTTP Access is necessary at this time as disaggregated wholesale HSA services are far from being implemented. The process for implementing these services outside of Ontario and Quebec has not even begun. Furthermore, TRP 2015-326 follow-up proceedings to configure and cost disaggregated wholesale HSA services have been repeatedly delayed by failures by Incumbents to abide by Commission disclosure and information rules and guidelines. Considering the Commission’s admonishing of the Incumbents in TO 2016-396 on similar grounds, CNOC submits that this consistent behavior suggests a pattern of conduct by Incumbents characterized by wilful disregard of the Commission’s rules and past determinations.

ES10. Even once final rates are set, competitors may struggle to secure demand conditions in Wholesale HSA Service Gaps to justify a transition to disaggregated wholesale HSA services over FTTP facilities once they become available.

ES11. The relief sought by CNOC essentially seeks the application of the Commission’s determinations in TD 2016-446 more broadly as a general rule that applies to all Wholesale HSA Service Gaps.

ES12. There are at least five reasons why a general rule is more appropriate than dealing with specific Wholesale Service Gaps via narrow ad-hoc Part 1 applications: (1) Competitors simply do not have the resources to prepare Part 1 applications to address these situations on an ad-hoc basis; (2) in contrast with a general rule that eliminates all existing and future service gaps, ad-hoc Part 1 applications involve a lengthy process which delays relief for the applicant; (3) retroactive relief via ad-hoc Part 1 applications is incapable of preventing competitive harms before they happen; (4) new ad-hoc Part 1 applications will be required every time a new Wholesale HSA Service Gap develops; and (5) ad-hoc Part 1 applications will needlessly consume limited industry and Commission regulatory resources.
ES13. As a feature of Transitional FTTP Access, CNOC requests access to all service speeds up to the highest speed offered on a wholesale basis by an Incumbent. This aspect of Transitional FTTP Access is critical given that Competitors have been precluded from competing at any retail service speed, much less speeds in excess of 100 Mbps, which is the speed threshold for aggregated wholesale HSA services established in TRP 2015-326. Given that TRP 2015-326 also grandfathered speeds in excess of 100 Mbps, CNOC submits that Transitional FTTP Access should provide for an extension of speed matching principles to offset the repressed state of competition wherever Wholesale HSA Service Gaps exist.

ES14. Transitional FTTP Access is urgently needed on an expedited basis. Expedited relief is critical to mitigating competitive harms resulting from existing Wholesale HSA Service Gaps and preventing further harms from future service gaps. If relief on an expedited basis is denied, irreparable harms to Competitors, competition and consumers would result even if Transitional FTTP Access is ultimately granted at the conclusion of a conventional non-expedited Part 1 proceeding.

ES15. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps allow Incumbents, without any meaningful competitive effort, to acquire and lock-in customers for years via fixed term service agreements that include early termination fees. It is therefore critical to prevent these wholesale service gaps, and resulting long-term harm to competition, from manifesting.

ES16. Expedited relief is critical to allow Competitors to begin developing a presence where Wholesale HSA Service Gaps exist. Expedited Transitional FTTP Access will allow Competitors to mitigate competitive harms incurred thus far, with a view to building a critical mass of demand that can justify infrastructure investment to support disaggregated wholesale HSA services in the future.

ES17. Expedited relief is also necessary to counteract the strong incentive for Incumbents to delay the follow-up costing proceedings to TRP 2016-379 via non-compliance with Commission disclosure rules and guidelines. Such delays push back the availability of disaggregated wholesale HSA services thereby creating additional Wholesale HSA Service Gaps that can be exploited by the Incumbents.
ES18. In order to facilitate expedited relief, CNOC requests an abbreviated period of fifteen (15) days for answers to the Application from Incumbents and interventions from other interested parties. CNOC would then have seven (7) days to reply. This abbreviated period for submissions strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring that parties have an adequate opportunity to provide meaningful comments with regards to the Application on one hand and on the other hand, appropriately accelerating this proceeding in light of the urgent nature of the relief that is being requested.

ES19. The relief requested in the Application is consistent with Subsections 7(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (h) of the Act and is also aligned with Subparagraphs 1(a)(ii), 1(b)(iv) and 1(c)(ii) of the Policy Direction. Transitional FTTP Access also furthers the specific policy objectives set out at paragraph 14 of TRP 2015-326.
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND NATURE OF ORDER SOUGHT

1.1 Introduction

1. Canadian Network Operators Consortium Inc. ("CNOC") is submitting this application ("Application") pursuant to Part 1 of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure\(^2\) ("Rules") and sections 24, 32 and 47 of the Telecommunications Act\(^3\) ("Act").

2. In the Application, CNOC seeks expedited relief that is necessary to address a situation that is creating wholesale high-speed access ("HSA") service coverage gaps\(^4\) ("Wholesale HSA Service Gaps") throughout the country. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps exist wherever an ILEC\(^5\) or Cable Carrier\(^6\) (individually, each an “Incumbent”\(^7\); collectively, “Incumbents”) has deployed fibre-to-the-premises ("FTTP") access facilities and where no other wireline access facilities available from that Incumbent are capable of providing high-speed Internet services.\(^8\) As a consequence, wholesale HSA services are not available from that Incumbent over which competitive Internet service providers (individually, “Competitor”\(^9\); collectively, “Competitors”) can offer retail high-speed Internet services.

3. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps have emerged as a result of a combination of: (1) changing market circumstances; and (2) the lengthy and still ongoing process to implement the

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\(^3\) S.C. 1993, c. 38, as amended.

\(^4\) A Wholesale HSA Service Gap exists where an Incumbent has deployed only FTTP access facilities over which wholesale HSA services are not available or where an Incumbent has deployed FTTP but where the only other wireline facilities available from that Incumbent over which wholesale HSA services are available are legacy wireline facilities that can support Internet services speeds of 6-7 Mbps at most.

\(^5\) I.e., Bell Aliant, Bell Canada, MTS Inc. ("MTS"), Saskatchewan Telecommunications ("SaskTel"), and TELUS Communications Company ("TCC").

\(^6\) Bragg Communications Incorporated, operating as Eastlink ("Eastlink"), Cogeco Cable Inc. ("Cogeco"), Quebecor Media Inc., on behalf of its affiliate Videotron G.P. ("Videotron"), Rogers Communications Canada Inc. ("RCCI") and Shaw Cablesystems G.P. ("Shaw") (these carriers are hereinafter called “Cable Carriers”).

\(^7\) Note: In this Application, CNOC also sometimes applies the meaning of “Incumbent” as an adjective.

\(^8\) CNOC defines high-speed Internet services as Internet services provided over mixed fibre and copper facilities (i.e. FTTN) and fibre-only facilities (i.e. FTTP). Internet services available over legacy wireline access services, which reach 6-7 Mbps at most, do not satisfy the definition of high-speed Internet services. This is consistent with the Commission’s determinations at paragraph 241 of Review of wholesale wireline services and associated policies, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2015-326, 22 July 2015 ("TRP 2015-326") that makes clear that wholesale legacy services, including low-speed DSL services that are not provided over FTTN or FTTP facilities, are distinct from wholesale high-speed access services.

\(^9\) Note: The Application also sometimes applies the term “Competitor” as an adjective (e.g. “Competitor access”).
Commission’s plan to transition from aggregated wholesale HSA services to a disaggregated model for wholesale HSA services, which will allow Competitors to access FTTP access facilities, as set out in Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2015-32610 (“TRP 2015-326”).

4. Essentially, the Wholesale HSA Service Gap problem is rooted in a central feature of the Commission’s TRP 2015-326 transition plan: the determination that mandated wholesale access to FTTP facilities shall only be available through disaggregated wholesale HSA services – which are not yet available.11

5. As the Commission is aware, the on-going proceedings and related costing exercises to implement disaggregated wholesale HSA services are lengthy and complex.12 In addition, these proceedings have also been subject to multiple delays – many of which relate to the Incumbents’ failure to abide by Commission information disclosure rules and guidelines.13 So while over twenty months have passed since TRP 2015-326 was issued, disaggregated wholesale HSA services have yet to be implemented and CNOC doubts that the final rates and terms and conditions for such services can be approved very quickly at this juncture. Furthermore, as the first phase of disaggregated wholesale HSA service implementation will only occur in Ontario and Quebec,14 the roll out of the disaggregated model and access to FTTP access facilities in other areas of Canada will occur even later.

6. Meanwhile, Incumbents continue to deploy FTTP access facilities. In areas throughout Canada, FTTP consists of the only wireline facilities15 over which residential or business customers can obtain high-speed Internet access and related telecommunications services.16 Wherever this is the case, no wholesale HSA services at regulated cost-based rates are available to Competitors.

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11 Id., at para 153.
13 Ibid.
14 TRP 2015-326, at para 152.
15 In other words, fibre-to-the-node (“FTTN”) facilities are not also available.
16 As noted at para 117 of TRP 2015-326, wholesale HSA services can be used to offer a variety of retail services including local phone, television, and Internet access services.
7. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps also exist in areas of Canada where FTTP access facilities are the only wireline facilities deployed by an ILEC (to which no wholesale obligations apply) and non-FTTP high-speed Internet services are available from the Cable Carrier (to which wholesale obligations apply), or vice versa. Competitors in these situations are often faced with prohibitively high costs of switching wholesale service platforms that prevent them from being able to provide service to customers that represent important business opportunities.

8. In all of the above circumstances, Incumbents enjoy significant market power flowing from what are essentially localized monopolies over their high-speed access facilities and corresponding ability to offer retail high-speed Internet services over those facilities (“monopolistic market conditions”), as Competitors are foreclosed from these key retail markets. In essence, the following expectation set out by the Commission in TRP 2015-326 is being realized at a very rapid pace:

   “As FTTP deployment increases, however, the potential impact on competition will increase as more and more consumers desiring higher-speed Internet services would have fewer competitor alternatives to choose from.”17

9. Since TRP 2015-326 was issued, the market for retail Internet services has been in a constant state of flux driven by end-user demand for increasingly higher-speeds in excess of 100 Mbps that are necessary to power a full suite of next generation applications including, for example, 4k video streaming. Wholesale service gaps affecting FTTP access facilities are therefore damaging to Competitors who experience strong demand for retail service speeds in excess of 100 Mbps but are foreclosed from competition for such services.

10. However, the harm is not limited only to consumers seeking Internet services at increasingly high-speeds in excess of 100 Mbps. Indeed, wholesale service gaps also prohibit consumers seeking high-speed Internet service at any speeds greater than 6-7 Mbps that are currently supported by fibre-to-the-node (“FTTN”) technologies18 from enjoying competitive choice of Internet service providers. In these cases, consumers are limited to selecting Internet service speeds of 6-7 Mbps from Competitors or higher speed Internet services from the Incumbent.

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17 TRP 2015-326, at para 128.
18 FTTN facilities exist both on ILEC and Cable Carrier (DOCSIS) platforms.
11. The wholesale service gaps that now exist and continue to develop run contrary to the Commission’s intentions with respect to the TRP 2015-326 transition plan, which explicitly states: “This transition plan will serve to ensure that wholesale access to the access facilities required to provision downstream retail services is always provided for.”\(^{19}\) (Emphasis added)

12. Fortunately, there is a straightforward and efficient solution to ensure that wholesale access to access facilities is always provided for. To this end, CNOC is requesting relief consisting of transitional access to wholesale high-speed access services over FTTP access facilities\(^{20}\) on an aggregated basis for all speeds up to the highest speed offered on a wholesale basis by an Incumbent including speeds in excess of 100 Mbps (hereinafter called “Transitional FTTP Access”) in the operating territory in which such access is sought on the following terms:

- **Scope of the Transitional FTTP Access:** CNOC requests Transitional FTTP Access throughout Canada, wherever an Incumbent offers FTTP retail high-speed Internet access services but does not offer any wholesale HSA Services to Competitors at speeds currently supported by FTTN technologies (since this condition represents a Wholesale HSA Service Gap);\(^ {21}\)

- **Incumbent providers of Transitional FTTP Access:** The obligation to provide Transitional FTTP Access should apply equally to the ILECs and Cable Carriers that were directed to continue to provide mandated wholesale HSA services in TRP 2015-326;

- **Transitional nature of the relief:** Transitional FTTP Access is necessary in the circumstances described above until: (i) wholesale disaggregated HSA service is made available in an ILEC central office or cable head-end that is capable of serving a

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\(^{19}\) TRP 2015-326, at para 143.

\(^{20}\) For additional certainty, fibre facilities include passive optical network (“PON”) facilities and radio frequency over glass (“RFOG”) facilities.

\(^{21}\) For clarity, CNOC is requesting Transitional Access to the FTTP facilities of any Incumbent (i.e., ILEC or Cable Carrier) that offers FTTP retail high-speed Internet access but does not offer any wholesale HSA Services to Competitors at speeds currently supported by FTTN technologies even where wholesale HSA Services from an Incumbent (i.e., Cable Carrier or ILEC) using an alternate platform may be available. This dimension of Transitional FTTP Access is critical given that Competitors often have no choice but to commit to one wholesale HSA service platform or the other. Once committed, the Competitor is bound by prohibitive switching costs which constitute a daunting barrier to competition in areas that may be served by another wholesale HSA service platform.
Wholesale HSA Service Gap; and (ii) a three-year phase out period has elapsed, consistent with the determinations in TRP 2015-326;\textsuperscript{22}

- **Rates applicable to Transitional FTTP Access:** Transitional FTTP Access should be subject to the rates applicable to equivalent service speeds available over FTTN facilities.

13. As will be demonstrated throughout this submission, there is a wealth of Commission precedents for the kind of transitional wholesale access that Transitional FTTP Access represents.

14. Eliminating Wholesale HSA Service Gaps is an essential step towards achieving the objectives underpinning TRP 2015-326\textsuperscript{23}, including: “enhancing the effectiveness of the wholesale service regime to facilitate vibrant and sustainable retail competition that provides Canadians with reasonable prices and innovative services of high quality that are responsive to their evolving social and economic requirements.”\textsuperscript{24}

15. Urgent time sensitivity surrounds the relief requested in the Application. In fact, expediting the relief requested in the Application is virtually as important as the relief itself. Expedited relief will prevent additional Wholesale HSA Service Gaps and associated long term market distortions from occurring. Expedited relief is also critical for providing Competitors with an opportunity to mitigate the economic harms created by existing Wholesale HSA Service Gaps. For instance, Transitional FTTP Access on an expedited basis will allow Competitors to immediately attempt to attract customers that, in turn, will create demand to justify investment in transport facilities necessary to support disaggregated wholesale HSA services.

16. In order to facilitate expedited relief, CNOC requests an abbreviated period of fifteen (15) days for answers to the Application from Incumbents and interventions from other interested parties. CNOC would then have seven (7) days to reply. This abbreviated period for submissions strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring that parties have an adequate opportunity to provide meaningful comments with regards to the Application on one hand and on the other hand,

\textsuperscript{22} TRP 2015-326, at para 155.
\textsuperscript{23} Id., at para 14.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
appropriately accelerating this proceeding in light of the urgent nature of the relief that is being requested.

17. The next section of this submission provides an overview of the structure of the Application.

1.2 Structure of the Application

18. The structure of the balance of this Application is described in this Section 1.2.

19. Part 2.0 of this submission provides a comprehensive overview of the regulatory status quo as it relates to wholesale HSA services in Canada. This statement of facts and accompanying analysis provide the contextual background for Transitional FTTP Access. This part of the Application also identifies key precedents for the relief requested by CNOC.

20. Part 3.0 then goes on to describe the circumstances that give rise to Wholesale HSA Service Gaps throughout the country and how those conditions have progressed since TRP 2015-326.

21. Part 4.0 makes the case for relief consisting of Transitional FTTP Access based on past Commission determinations and the prevailing market conditions.

22. Part 5.0 explains why Transitional FTTP Access is urgently needed on an expedited basis.

23. Part 6.0 then demonstrates why the relief requested in the Application is consistent with the telecommunications policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Act as well as the Policy Direction25.

24. Part 7.0 sets out CNOC’s conclusions.

2.0 WHOLESALE HSA REGULATORY STATUS QUO AND KEY PRECEDENTS FOR TRANSITIONAL FTTP ACCESS

25. Although the introduction to the Application provides a brief overview of the regulatory context justifying CNOC’s request for relief, a more fulsome review of the regulatory status quo is warranted. The foregoing sections explain how Wholesale HSA Service Gaps have developed.

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CNOC also underscores notable Commission precedents where transitional wholesale access was granted to prevent wholesale service coverage gaps leading up to the final implementation of core regulatory policies and approval of related wholesale rates, as well as terms and conditions.

## 2.1 Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2015-326

26. As aforementioned, the current wireline wholesale services framework was established in TRP 2015-326. The core features of the framework are as follows:

- Disaggregated wholesale HSA services, including over FTTP access facilities, are now mandated for the Incumbents;\(^{26}\)
- Competitors desiring access to customers served by FTPP access facilities will only be able to do so by using disaggregated wholesale HSA service;\(^{27}\)
- Disaggregated wholesale HSA services will be implemented in phases, starting with Ontario and Quebec;\(^{28}\)
- Aggregated wholesale HSA over FTTP access facilities will not be mandated for the Incumbents;\(^{29}\)
- Aggregated wholesale HSA services will be phased out for each Incumbent as of three-years from the date that disaggregated wholesale HSA service is provided at a given central office or head-end;\(^{30}\)
- After the phase-out period has ended, the Incumbent will have a choice to continue offering aggregated wholesale HSA services at tariffed rates, withdraw service or provide the service on a forbearance basis, following approval of a forbearance application;\(^{31}\)

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\(^{26}\) TRP 2015-326, at para 143.
\(^{27}\) Id., at para 153.
\(^{28}\) Id., at para 152.
\(^{29}\) Id., at para 153.
\(^{30}\) Id., at para 155.
\(^{31}\) Id., at para 156.
• A download speed cap of 100 Mbps will apply to service speeds available over aggregated wholesale HSA services, however, existing aggregated wholesale HSA service speeds available at the time of the decision are to be grandfathered by Incumbents.32

27. In TRP 2015-326, the Commission went on to describe a follow-up implementation proceeding to be initiated within 30 days of the decision and a related tariff process that would apply once the configurations for disaggregated wholesale HSA services are approved by the Commission.33 As emphasized above, the Commission expressed a clear intent that its transition plan from aggregated to disaggregated wholesale HSA services would ensure that wholesale access to access facilities required to provision downstream retail services is always provided for.34

2.2 The Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-379 process

28. Congruently with the publication of TRP 2015-326, the Commission issued a letter setting out a process for the follow-up proceeding that would ultimately lead to Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-37935 (“TD 2016-379”). The exact details of the disaggregated wholesale HSA configuration approved by the Commission in TD 2016-379 are not germane to the matters at hand. However, the procedural timelines surrounding TD 2016-379 and its follow-up costing proceedings have a notable significance for the Application. CNOC wishes to emphasize the following aspects of the process leading to and following TD 2016-379:

• By way of a letter dated 31 July 2015, Bell, Cogeco, RCCI and Videotron (the “TD 2016-379 Incumbents”) filed a request for a one month extension to file disaggregated service configurations. The Commission granted this request on 13 August 2015.

• On 21 August 2015, the TD 2016-379 Incumbents filed responses to Commission requests for information (“RFIs”).

32 Id., at para 154.
33 Id., at para 160.
34 Id., at para 143.
35 Follow-up to Telecom Regulatory Policy 2015-326 – Implementation of a disaggregated wholesale high-speed access service, including over fibre-to-the premises access facilities, Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-379, 20 September 2016.
• On 27 August 2015, CNOC filed a 12 page letter regarding the responses to the Commission RFIs and requested disclosure of information improperly designated as confidential and additional information that is necessary for interested parties to meaningfully scrutinize the materials filed by the TD 2016-379 Incumbents.

• On 25 September 2015, the TD 2016-379 Incumbents filed proposed disaggregated wholesale HSA configurations.

• On 12 October 2015, CNOC filed a 5 page letter and an accompanying 17 pages of RFIs that were intended to produce information necessary to address critical informational gaps in the proposed wholesale HSA configurations filed by the TD 2016-379 Incumbents. In response to this letter, the Commission issued further RFIs to the TD 2016-379 Incumbents on 6 November 2015.

• On 3 December 2015, the TD 2016-379 Incumbents filed responses to the Commission’s RFIs received on 6 November 2015.

• On 11 December 2015, CNOC filed a 6 page letter seeking disclosure of information improperly filed as confidential and additional information relating to the above noted RFI responses. The Commission granted additional disclosure pursuant to these requests on 15 January 2016.

• Following the submission of interventions and replies from TD 2016-379 Incumbents as well as interested parties, the Commission issued TD 2016-379 on 20 September 2016 in which the Commission ordered the TD 2016-379 Incumbents to file tariffs as well as Phase II cost studies for their disaggregated wholesale HSA service configurations that reflect the determinations in the decision.36

• On 30 September 2016, Bell filed a request for an extension for all TD 2016-379 Incumbents amounting to an additional six weeks to file tariffs and Phase II cost studies. On 1 November 2016, the Commission ultimately approved a more reasonably balanced three week extension proposed by CNOC.

36 Id., at para 161.
• Over the course of the tariffing process, CNOC filed: (1) a 21 page letter on 25 January 2017 addressing egregiously deficient tariff notices and supporting cost studies filed by the TD 2016-379 Incumbents and requesting appropriate levels of disclosure and additional information that is necessary so that interested parties could meaningfully scrutinize the Incumbent cost studies; and (2) a request for disclosure and additional information dated 10 February 2017 relating to Bell’s separate Tariff Notice and cost study associated with disaggregated wholesale HSA service meet-me-points.

29. On 9 March 2017, as amended by a subsequent letter on 10 March 2017, the Commission issued a letter explaining that a procedural letter can be expected in the near future to explain the next steps in the disaggregated wholesale HSA evaluation process.

30. The summary provided above is meant to emphasize the extent to which the implementation of disaggregated wholesale HSA services has been delayed. To be clear, CNOC acknowledges that in most cases, the extensions to deadlines requested by the TD 2016-379 Incumbents were either partially or fully justified. The grounds supporting Commission approved extensions are clearly legitimate. Based on its own experience in these follow-up proceedings, CNOC can confirm that the technical design and costing work relating to disaggregated wholesale HSA services is complex and requires dedicated resources. However, the TD 2016-379 process has also been frustrated and delayed by repeated Incumbent failures to abide by the Commission’s disclosure rules and guidelines. These delays simply do not have the same air of legitimacy as approved requests for extensions to filing deadlines.

31. The incidence of blatant Incumbent non-compliance with Commission rules and directives is seemingly increasing. In Telecom Order CRTC 2016-39637 (“TO 2016-396”), the Commission found that most wholesale HSA service providers are choosing to wilfully disregard the Commission staff’s guidance, the Phase II Costing Manual and relevant past Commission determinations.38 To accompany TO 2016-396, the Commission also issued a press release

37 Tariff notice applications concerning aggregated wholesale high-speed access services – Revised interim rates, Telecom Order CRTC 2016-396, 6 October 2016.
38 Id., at para 22.
admonishing the conduct of the Incumbents. The press release included the following resounding quote from Jean-Pierre Blais, Commission Chairman and CEO:

“Competitors that provide retail Internet services to Canadians using wholesale high-speed services must have access to these services at just and reasonable prices. The fact that these large companies did not respect accepted costing principles and methodologies is very disturbing. What’s even more concerning is the fact that Canadians’ access to a choice of broadband Internet services would have been at stake had we not revised these rates. As always, we strive to create a dynamic competitive telecommunications market for Canadians.”

32. Following TO 2016-396, CNOC is concerned that the Incumbents continue to have strong incentives to willfully disregard the Commission’s rules and directives in the follow-up process to TD 2016-379.

33. Whether ongoing procedural delays are legitimate or not, they result in increasingly widespread instances of Wholesale HSA Service Gaps. Every delay to the implementation of disaggregated wholesale HSA results in new business for the Incumbents, lost business for Competitors and a missed opportunity to ensure that consumers can enjoy the benefits that flow from competitive choice supported by wholesale HSA services.

2.3 Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-446

34. On 4 December 2015, CNOC member TekSavvy Solutions Inc. (“TekSavvy”) filed a Part 1 application requesting transitional wholesale access to aggregated wholesale HSA service in the Bayview Mills Condominium Townhouse community (the “Bayview Mills complex”). TekSavvy identified a situation whereby RCCI had upgraded its cable distribution network from DOCSIS-hybrid fibre-coaxial (“HFC”), which has long been considered a wholesale HSA service platform, to DOCSIS over Radio Frequency over Glass (“RFOG”). In doing so, RCCI characterized its deployment in the Bayview Mills complex as an FTTP access facility to which wholesale obligations did not apply. In response, TekSavvy requested that the Commission: (i) direct RCCI to halt the removal of existing coaxial infrastructure at the Bayview Mills complex

40 Ibid.
41 TekSavvy Solutions Inc. Application in respect of ensuring transitional wholesale access, 4 December 2015, CRTC File No. 8663-T117-201513325.
until the issues raised in its application have been disposed of; or (ii) ensure that wholesale access to the access facilities required to provision downstream retail Internet services is always provided for pursuant to existing tariffs in a technology-neutral manner. The Commission issued its ruling regarding TekSavvy’s application by way of Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-44642 (“TD 2016-446”).43

35. TekSavvy’s application sought transitional access to aggregated wholesale HSA service with respect to a Wholesale HSA Service Gap. The Commission’s determinations in TD 2016-446 are therefore of profound importance to this Application, which seeks identical transitional access, albeit as a general rule, wherever Wholesale HSA Service Gaps exist. The Commission’s findings in TD 2016-446 with pronounced precedential significance are as follows:

- DOCSIS over RFOG constitute FTTP, and not FTTN, facilities;44
- During the oral phase of the proceeding leading to TRP 2015-326, “…the incumbent carriers generally assured the Commission that they had no intention of removing existing copper or coaxial access facilities when installing entirely fibre access facilities”. Because of this assurance, the Commission did not specifically address what regulatory obligations, if any, should apply when Incumbents remove copper or coaxial access;45
- RCCI should continue to provide TekSavvy and other competitors with access to aggregated wholesale HSA service over FTTP access facilities in the Bayview Mills complex; 46
- RCCI’s removal of coaxial access facilities in the Bayview Mills complex resulted in the foreclosure of competitor access to new end-users located in this complex by way of the company’s existing aggregated wholesale HSA service;47 and perhaps most importantly:

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42 TekSavvy Solutions Inc. – Application regarding transitional access to aggregated wholesale high-speed access service, Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-446, 9 November 2016.
43 Id., at para 4.
44 Id., at para 18.
45 Id., at para 23.
46 Id., at para 36.
47 Ibid.
“By denying competitors the ability to seek new end-users in the Bayview Mills complex on the aggregated wholesale HSA service over FTTP access facilities, RCCI would be conferring upon itself an undue preference and subjecting competitors to an undue disadvantage, since only RCCI would be able to access new end-users in that complex until such time as RCCI has an approved disaggregated wholesale HSA service that competitors wish to use. In addition, if the Commission were to accept RCCI’s request that TekSavvy should not be allowed to acquire any new end-users on the aggregated wholesale HSA service over FTTP access facilities, it would result in less consumer choice and competition in the Bayview Mills complex, as well as undermine competitors’ ability to acquire sufficient end-user demand to migrate to a disaggregated wholesale HSA service in the future.”

48 (Emphasis added.)

- The existence of wholesale HSA services from another Incumbent in the Bayview Mills complex was not a factor in the Commission’s determinations that RCCI should continue to provide TekSavvy and other competitors with access to aggregated wholesale HSA service over FTTP access facilities in the Bayview Mills complex.

36. Based on the above-noted findings, the Commission directed RCCI to provide TekSavvy and other competitors with access to existing and new end-users in the Bayview Mills complex by way of aggregated wholesale HSA service provisioned over its FTTP access facilities, at the same speeds and rates provided for in its aggregated wholesale HSA service tariff, and subject to the conditions imposed in TRP 2015-326.49

37. TekSavvy also submitted a list of 169 Toronto-area residential multi-dwelling units that have been foreclosed from competition under similar circumstances to those affecting the Bayview Mills complex.50 However, the Commission decided that there was insufficient evidence to establish a clear record of the situations prevailing at these locations and therefore chose not to take any further action.51

38. The significance of TD 2016-446 to the Application should be abundantly clear. Presented with a clear situation involving a Wholesale HSA Service Gap, the Commission applied a remedy

48 Id., at para 35.
49 Id., at para 36.
50 Id., at para 39.
51 Id., at para 41.
with strong resemblance to Transitional FTTP Access. TD 2016-446 therefore stands as a pivotal and recent precedent for the relief requested in this Application.

2.4 Cable resale regimes pending the availability of third party Internet access services

39. In the cable realm, the Commission has a longstanding practice of applying transitional resale regimes pending the availability of third party Internet access (“TPIA”) services within the operating territory of a Cable Carrier. For example, Telecom Decision CRTC 99-11\(^52\) represents the inception of mandated cable resale obligations until incumbent Cable Carriers are able to provide TPIA. Thereafter, in Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-87\(^53\) and Telecom Decision CRTC 2004-24\(^54\), the Commission extended the cable resale obligation to Shaw. More recently, in Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-67\(^55\), the Commission directed Eastlink to provide cable resale in its serving territory in the Atlantic Provinces until Eastlink TPIA services were implemented.

40. All of these Commission decisions represent precedents for a solution that provides Competitors with transitional wholesale access in anticipation of the establishment of a more permanent wholesale services framework. The relief requested in this Application is no different.

2.5 Telecom Order CRTC 2011-377

41. Telecom Order CRTC 2011-377\(^56\) (“TO 2011-377”) constitutes yet another example of a transitional wholesale access regime. Notably, this regime was first proposed by the Commission by its own initiative, in recognition of “the importance of providing competitors with access to higher-speed and increased POI aggregation services as soon as possible in order to respond to the needs of consumers.”\(^57\) To this end, TO 2011-377 was a short-term measure that established an interim resale framework for wholesale HSA services supported by FTTN facilities. This

\(^52\) Application concerning access by Internet service providers to incumbent cable carriers' telecommunications facilities, Telecom Decision CRTC 99-11, 14 September 1999.

\(^53\) Application by Cybersurf seeking resale of Shaw higher-speed retail Internet service, Telecom Decision CRTC 2003-87, 21 December 2003.


\(^55\) The Canadian Network Operators Consortium Inc. – Application for relief regarding the pricing and availability of Eastlink's higher-speed retail Internet service for resale, Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-67, 24 February 2016.

\(^56\) Interim rates for wholesale residential and business high-speed access services, Telecom Order CRTC 2011-377, 15 June 2011.

\(^57\) Id., at para 2.
transitional model would last until final rates, terms and conditions for wholesale HSA services were established by way of Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-703\(^{58}\) ("TRP 2011-703") and Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2011-704\(^{59}\) (TRP 2011-704").

42. The transitional wholesale access regime introduced by TO 2011-377 is a template for the relief requested in this Application. Transitional FTTP Access and the interim wholesale regime established in TO 2011-377 share the same fundamental purpose: to address gaps in the regulatory framework governing wholesale HSA services such that Competitors can respond to the needs of consumers. Likewise, the Commission orders in TO 2011-377 and the relief requested in the Application are of a transitional nature that is intended to persist until a final regulatory policy can take hold. In the case of TO 2011-377, the final regime was cemented by way of TRP 2011-703 and TRP 2011-704. In the case of the relief requested in this Application, the final regime will take hold once disaggregated wholesale HSA services are implemented at the conclusion of the TRP 2016-379 follow-up proceedings.

43. The next part of the Application provides insight into the nature and prevalence of Wholesale HSA Service Gaps.

**3.0 WHOLESALE HSA SERVICE GAPS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY LARGE AND PREVALENT**

44. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps generally develop under three sets of conditions that have progressed significantly since TRP 2015-326: (1) Greenfield\(^{60}\) FTTP deployments by an Incumbent where that Incumbent has only deployed FTTP access facilities over which wholesale HSA services cannot be provided; (2) Brownfield\(^{61}\) FTTP deployments by an Incumbent where the only wireline facilities available from that Incumbent to provide wholesale HSA services are legacy wireline facilities; and (3) Brownfield FTTP deployments by an Incumbent where that

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60 In the Application, “Greenfield” means a new network installation occurring in conjunction with new construction of the end-user premises over undeveloped or repurposed land (e.g., a new residential single family home development or multi-dwelling unit building).

61 In contrast with the above definition of “Greenfield”, “Brownfield” means a network installation, upgrade or configuration occurring at existing end-user premises on developed land.
Incumbent has removed all of its previously existing wireline facilities over which wholesale HSA services could be provided.

45. A comparison between the 2014 Communications Monitoring Report ("2014 CMR") and the 2016 Communications Monitoring Report ("2016 CMR") provides revealing insight into the prevalence of the above-listed Wholesale HSA Service Gaps. Consider that the 2014 CMR\(^{62}\) reported that FTTP represented 2.9% of residential lines using fibre optic while the remaining percentage of lines was made up of 23.5% FTTN and 73.6% non-fibre.\(^{63}\) Two years later, the 2016 CMR\(^{64}\) reported that FTTP represented 8.9% (a difference of 6%) of residential lines using fibre optic while the remaining percentage of lines was made up of 22.9% FTTN (a difference of -0.6%) and 68.1% non-fibre (a difference of -5.5%). In other words, there has been a disproportionate increase in FTTP residential lines relative to FTTN and non-fibre residential lines over a two-year period. This disproportionate increase immediately suggests that Incumbents are deploying FTTP access facilities in areas where they do not also control FTTN access facilities.

46. It is also important to acknowledge the incentives that Incumbents have to deploy FTTP facilities as the sole wireline access facilities that connect end-users.

47. From a technological perspective, FTTP is the superior choice of access facilities when compared to FTTN or legacy wireline facilities.\(^{65}\) The technology is at the dawn of its life cycle and presents opportunities for practically unlimited capacity.\(^{66}\) By comparison, legacy facilities have reached peak service speeds long ago and while FTTN facilities continue to be pushed to their limits, the ceiling for this technology will also be reached in the near future.\(^{67}\)

48. The current regulatory environment, as summarized above in Part 2.0 of the Application, also unintentionally provides powerful incentives for Incumbents to deploy FTTP access facilities on an exclusive basis, wherever possible. Incumbents are well aware that in the wake of TRP 2015-

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\(^{62}\) Note: the 2014 CMR reports data for the 2013 year.
\(^{63}\) 2014 Communications Monitoring Report, at Figure 5.1.6.
\(^{64}\) Note: the 2016 CMR reports data for the 2016 year.
\(^{65}\) For instance, see Section 3.3 of the Nordicity Report entitled “Wireless Substitutability: Examination of the Substitutability of Wireless for Wireline Broadband Connectivity” (the “Nordicity Report”) filed as Attachment “B” to the CNOOC intervention dated 27 June 2014 in the proceeding leading to TRP 2015-326, which explores FTTP technologies and compares them to FTTN facilities.
\(^{66}\) Ibid.
\(^{67}\) Ibid.
326, FTTP access facilities represent a gateway to localized monopolistic market conditions given that these facilities are free of any wholesale HSA service obligations.

49. Incumbents stand to profit immensely from localized monopolistic market conditions in both Greenfield and Brownfield conditions. This situation ensures that the Incumbent will enjoy exclusive access to a specific customer base for an indeterminate period of time. Although TRP 2015-326 creates a future opportunity for competitive access to FTTP facilities on a disaggregated basis, the transition to disaggregated wholesale HSA services is contingent upon a Competitor’s acquisition of sufficient end-user demand that is necessary to justify investment in transport facilities. As recognized by the Commission in TD 2016-446, Wholesale HSA Service Gaps could preclude Competitors from ever establishing a critical mass of demand that will justify a transition to disaggregated wholesale HSA services over FTTP access facilities. Accordingly, ILECs and Cable Carriers can eliminate wireline-based competition by any other service providers by ensuring that their FTTP access facilities are deployed to the exclusion of all other wireline platforms.

50. The balance of this Part 3.0 of the Application addresses each of the above-listed conditions leading to Wholesale HSA Service Gaps.

**Greenfield FTTP deployments**

51. Greenfield deployments of FTTP access facilities are prevalent given that the business case for deploying future-looking FTTP technology in Greenfield situations is especially palpable due to the cost-efficiencies inherent to new developments (for example, running fibre to individual homes in a residential community development is greatly facilitated by ease of access to subterranean conduits). In contrast, buried deployments in a Brownfield scenario involve significant additional costs and construction time delays. These obstacles are overcome in Greenfield situations that provide ease of access to subterranean conduits without significant public disruption. The cost and delays associated with Brownfield buried deployments are main reasons why aerial fibre builds are generally preferred over buried deployments in Brownfield conditions, as acknowledged in recent Bell press releases, for instance: “More than 90% of Bell's network in the city is on aerial structures already in place, which will help to speed the deployment of the new fibre links.” As stated in *Bell investing $854 million in Montréal to bring the fastest broadband fibre technology directly to homes and businesses across the city*, 27 March 2017, <http://www.bce.ca/news-and-
52. Greenfield FTTP deployments have resulted in Wholesale HSA Service Gaps throughout the country. CNOC members have been foreclosed from competition in both urban and suburban areas. These Wholesale HSA Service Gaps affect single family dwellings as well as multi-dwelling units. The situation applies to large residential community developments and smaller development projects within established communities. Greenfield FTTP access facilities without overlapping FTTN access facilities is also a common occurrence for new commercial and business developments including malls, store outlets and office buildings.

53. In summary, Wholesale HSA Service Gaps due to Greenfield FTTP deployments are now commonplace and the problem is worsening.

54. Greenfield developments ought to represent competitive battlefields for the business of new customers. Instead, Greenfield residential and business markets have become competitive dead zones which the Incumbents are exploiting to their sole benefit.

**Brownfield FTTP deployments which bypass FTTN access facilities**

55. CNOC members have also been precluded from wholesale HSA services in situations where Incumbents have introduced FTTP access facilities to a location where no wireline facilities otherwise exist or where only legacy wireline facilities also exist. In other words, in these instances, Incumbents bypass FTTN access facilities entirely. Wherever this occurs, Competitors only have access to wholesale services that allow them to compete at retail service speeds that max out at 6-7 Mbps – assuming that legacy access facilities exist at all at the location in question. In contrast, a Brownfield FTTP deployment allows the Incumbent to enjoy monopolistic market conditions over retail service speeds ranging from 7 Mbps to in excess of 1 Gbps. Consequently, the effect of bypassing FTTN access facilities in Brownfield deployments results in an acute Wholesale HSA Service Gap.

56. CNOC members have generally encountered the situation described above with respect to business and commercial single or multi-dwelling unit buildings such as malls, store outlets or

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office buildings as well as residential multi-dwelling unit buildings.\textsuperscript{71} These situations occur in urban and suburban areas alike.

57. There are several examples of large scale Incumbent FTTP projects that involve sweeping brownfield conversions to FTTP access facilities. For instance, within the province of Quebec, the following locations have undergone significant Bell FTTP builds: Beloeil, Blainville, Chambly, Châteauguay, Gatineau, Joliette, La Prairie, Laval, Lévis, Magog, Montre‌al, Québec City, Repentigny, Saint-Constant, Saint-Eustache, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Saint-Jérôme, Saint-Luc, Sherbrooke, Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, Sorel-Tracy, Terrebonne and Vaudreuil-Dorion.\textsuperscript{72} In fact, on 27 March 2017, Bell announced that it would invest a further $854 million to bring FTTP throughout Montreal.\textsuperscript{73} Cogeco has also deployed FTTP in several Quebec communities.\textsuperscript{74}

58. In Ontario, Bell’s FTTP footprint covers Toronto, Sudbury, North Bay, Peterborough, Kingston and many more cities.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} For example, with respect to FTTP deployments at commercial premises, Bell issued the a press release stating the following: “With the fast growth of Fibe TV in Ontario and Québec and FibreOP TV in Atlantic Canada, Bell's IPTV coverage footprint has now reached 6.1 million homes, up from 5.1 million at the start of 2014. Fibe is also making significant inroads with small and medium business as medical and dental offices, restaurants, repair shops and other customer-service focused businesses switch to Fibe TV to entertain and inform their customers.” in Bell's Fibe TV and FibreOP TV now serve 1 million Canadians, 17 April 2015, <http://www.bce.ca/news-and-media/releases/show/Bell-s-Fibe-TV-and-FibreOP-TV-now-serve-1-million-Canadians?page=2&month=&year=>.

\textsuperscript{72} Bell Gigabit Fibe: Canada's fastest Internet service now available to 1.3 million homes, 10 August 2015. <http://www.bce.ca/news-and-media/releases/show/Bell-Gigabit-Fibe-Canada-s-fastest-Internet-service-now-available-to-1-3-million-homes-1>.


59. In Atlantic Canada, Bell FTTP is available in over 100 communities\textsuperscript{76} including Saint-John, Charlottetown, Halifax, Fredericton and Moncton.\textsuperscript{77}

60. In Western Canada, TELUS FTTP connections are available in Chilliwack, Burnaby, Kitimat, Surrey, Edmonton and many other locations in British Columbia and Alberta.\textsuperscript{78}

61. All of the examples outlined above are but a small sample of the ever increasing Incumbent Brownfield FTTP projects throughout the country. These massive FTTP deployment projects invariably create Wholesale HSA Service Gaps that cover communities, neighbourhoods and individual buildings.

\textit{Brownfield FTTP deployments with corresponding removal of legacy wireline facilities}

62. CNOC members have also reported instances where Incumbent Brownfield FTTP deployments have resulted in corresponding removal of pre-existing legacy wireline facilities. Such occurrences are especially disturbing given that Incumbents assured the Commission over the course of proceeding leading to TRP 2015-326 that they had no intention of removing existing copper or coaxial access facilities when installing entirely fibre access facilities.\textsuperscript{79} In spite of these assurances, CNOC members have witnessed removal of legacy wireline facilities following the deployment of FTTP access facilities. These circumstances have affected Brownfield locations such as those described above.

63. Wherever legacy wireline facilities are removed and replaced with FTTP access facilities, Competitors are precluded from competing for customers at even the lowest end of the retail Internet service speed spectrum.

\textsuperscript{76} More speed and more TV - Bell Aliant gives customers more this fall with FibreOP, 29 September 2015, \textless http://www.bce.ca/news-and-media/releases/show/More-speed-and-more-TV-Bell-Aliant-gives-customers-more-this-fall-with-FibreOP-1?page=2&month=&year=\textgreater.

\textsuperscript{77} Bell Gigabit Fibe bringing the fastest Internet to Toronto residents with a billion-dollar+ network investment, creation of 2,400 direct jobs, 25 June 2015, \textless http://www.thepeterboroughexaminer.com/2015/01/15/bell-to-invest-35-million-in-new-technology-locally.\textgreater.


\textsuperscript{79} TD 2016-446, at para 23.
4.0 THE CASE FOR TRANSITIONAL FTTP ACCESS

64. Having summarized the regulatory status quo and described the prevalence of Wholesale HSA Service Gaps, CNOC will now justify its request for Transitional FTTP Access based on these Commission policies and prevailing market conditions.

65. The justification for Transitional FTTP Access is simple and straightforward. In TRP 2015-326, the Commission determined that the transition from aggregated to disaggregated wholesale HSA services must ensure that wholesale access to access facilities required to provision downstream retail services is always provided for. However, without Transitional FTTP Access, the Commission’s transition plan cannot live up to this purpose. As explained in Part 3.0 of this submission, Competitors currently lack the wholesale access that is necessary to provide downstream retail services in several localized areas throughout the country where an Incumbent’s only access facilities capable of supporting high-speed Internet services consist of FTTP access facilities, which are currently free of any wholesale HSA obligations.

66. Immediate regulatory action is critical. The problems described in the Application will not simply go away once disaggregated wholesale HSA services become available. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps create localized market failures that have economic consequences that will persist long after Competitors finally gain access to wholesale HSA services over FTTP facilities on a disaggregated basis.

67. Wholesale access to FTTP access facilities on a disaggregated basis is not simply ‘around the corner’. The TRP 2015-326 follow-up proceedings to configure and cost disaggregated wholesale HSA services have been repeatedly delayed by Incumbent failures to abide by Commission disclosure and information rules and guidelines. A substantial amount of work lays in front of the industry and the Commission before rates for disaggregated wholesale HSA services can be approved on a final basis for Ontario and Quebec. The rest of Canada faces an even longer period of time until the deployment of disaggregated wholesale HSA services and Competitor access to FTTP facilities.

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80 TRP 2015-326, at para 143.
81 I.e., the proceeding leading to TRP 2016-379 and the follow-up costing process.
68. Further, even once final rates are set, Competitors may struggle to secure demand conditions in Wholesale HSA Service Gaps to justify a transition to disaggregated wholesale HSA services over FTTP facilities once they become available.

69. Wholesale HSA Service gaps create profound consequences for competition wherever they exist. Invariably, consumers will suffer the greatest economic harm as a result of the monopolistic market conditions that have and will continue to flourish absent any form of transitional access to FTTP access facilities. Fundamentally, these are the same circumstances which prompted the Commission to establish interim wholesale access regimes in anticipation of TPIA tariff approval, in the case of Cable Carriers, and more broadly with respect to the wholesale HSA services of all Incumbents, in TO 2011-377 as a stop gap measure until TRP 2011-703 and TRP 2011-704 were issued. If these precedents were not enough, TD 2016-446 consists of a far more recent Commission ruling on virtually identical facts to those supporting the Application.

70. In TD 2016-446, the Commission was explicit that the wholesale HSA service gap at the Bayview Mills complex was unacceptable and transitional access over FTTP access facilities consisted of an appropriate remedy. The Application essentially seeks to apply the TD 2016-446 determinations more broadly as a general rule that applies to all Wholesale HSA Service Gaps.

71. There are at least five reasons why a general rule governing Wholesale HSA Service Gaps is more appropriate than maintaining the current expectation that Competitors may only obtain regulatory relief by submitting narrow ad-hoc Part 1 applications addressing specific instances of Wholesale HSA Service Gaps.

- First, Competitors who rely on wholesale HSA services have limited regulatory resources. The cost of preparing a Part 1 application with supportive evidence to address a narrow set of Wholesale HSA Service Gaps is prohibitively expensive. Many Competitors who are affected by Wholesale HSA Service Gaps simply cannot afford to redirect personnel resources from critical operational duties to regulatory matters, especially on a case-by-case basis.

- Second, a general rule instantly addresses all current and future Wholesale HSA Service Gaps. By contrast, an ad-hoc Part 1 application involves a lengthy process,
which, in turn, delays relief for the applicant. For reference, TD 2016-446 was issued 11 months after TekSavvy originally filed its Part 1 application.

- Third, even if future *ad-hoc* Part 1 applications for transitional relief are resolved more quickly, a lapse of even a few months before the Commission grants relief is enough for monopolistic market conditions to take a firm hold in a Wholesale HSA Service Gap. Retroactive relief via *ad-hoc* Part 1 applications is incapable of preventing competitive harms before they happen. In the period of time ranging from when a Wholesale HSA Service Gap first emerges to when a Competitor prepares and files a Part 1 application seeking relief and finally, when the Commission issues a ruling – irreparable competitive damage will have already occurred. In the interim, Incumbents will continue to benefit from monopolistic market conditions in a manner that will make competitive entry in many areas extremely difficult and even insurmountable, now, thereby creating significant competitive disadvantages and market distortions that will translate into a substantial lessening of competition even when FTTP access facilities becomes available via the disaggregated model.

- Fourth, if a general rule regarding Wholesale HSA Service Gaps is not established, Competitors will be required to file new Part 1 applications each and every time a new Greenfield or Brownfield Wholesale HSA Service Gap develops.

- Fifth and finally, Transitional FTTP Access is a far more efficient approach to resolving Wholesale HSA Service Gaps from the perspective of the industry and the Commission. Conversely, the continued expectation that Competitors must deal with these situations via several narrowly framed *ad-hoc* Part 1 applications will needlessly consume precious regulatory resources for the Commission and all interested parties.

72. For all of the above reasons, CNOC submits that the relief requested in the Application, as a rule of general application, will serve as an efficient and effective solution to all current and future Wholesale HSA Service Gaps throughout Canada. This outcome conforms to the Commission’s intention to establish a transition plan that “…will serve to ensure that wholesale
access to the access facilities required to provision downstream retail services is always provided for.”82

73. An essential feature of Transitional FTTP Access is that it must also unambiguously make available wholesale HSA services for all service speeds up to the highest speed offered on a wholesale basis by an Incumbent – even if that speed is greater than 100 Mbps, which is the speed threshold set by TRP 2015-326.83 This feature of Transitional FTTP Access is essential given that Wholesale HSA Service Gaps have precluded Competitors from any competition in downstream retail markets for true high-speed Internet and related telecommunications services, while TRP 2015-326 also contemplates the grandfathering of existing aggregated wholesale HSA customers that are served above the speed threshold.84 As such, Competitors have been denied an opportunity to order any wholesale HSA services, much less service speeds in excess of 100 Mbps. Thus, where there are Wholesale HSA Services Gaps, there can be no grandfathering of service speeds in excess of 100 Mbps at the present time. As a result, a speed limit of 100 Mbps would further prejudice Competitors that have endured Wholesale HSA Service Gaps. This prejudice is exacerbated by the significant and growing customer demand for retail service speeds in excess of 100 Mbps that CNOC members are witnessing.

74. It is for these reasons that CNOC’s proposed solution is to ensure that Transitional FTTP Access is available for all service speeds up to the highest speed offered on a wholesale basis by an Incumbent. Fundamentally, this consists of a simple extension of the speed matching principles. CNOC submits that this proposal is a reasonable, principled and fair solution that will meaningfully improve levels of competition wherever Transitional FTTP Access will apply.

75. On all of the above grounds, the case for Transitional FTTP Access is clear and compelling.

76. As explained in the next section, the need for relief on an expedited basis is as important as the relief itself.

82 TRP 2015-326, at para 143.
83 Id., at para 154.
84 Id., at para 154.
5.0 THE NEED FOR EXPEDITED RELIEF

77. Leading up to this Part 5.0 of the Application, CNOC has emphasized the urgency of implementing Transitional FTTP Access. Expedited relief is critical to mitigating competitive harms resulting from existing Wholesale HSA Service Gaps and preventing further harms from future service gaps. If relief on an expedited basis is denied, irreparable harms to Competitors, competition and consumers would result even if Transitional FTTP Access is ultimately granted at the conclusion of a conventional non-expedited part 1 proceeding.

78. Wherever Wholesale HSA Service Gaps exist, the Incumbents do not have to win customers since market conditions do not feature meaningful levels of consumer choice generated by the availability of wholesale HSA services. Wholesale HSA Service Gaps provide the Incumbent with an opportunity, unimpeded by real competition, to sign-up end-users to retail telecommunications service contracts. These service agreements are often subject to two-year terms that contemplate termination fees for early cancellations by end-users. Thus, Wholesale HSA Service Gaps allow Incumbents, without any meaningful competitive effort, to acquire and lock-in customers for years.

79. As a result of the regulatory status quo, an Incumbent can secure monopolistic market conditions over a very long period of time. Even when disaggregated wholesale HSA services become available at a given location served exclusively via FTTP access facilities, end-users will face substantial barriers to switching providers as a result of their contractual commitments to the Incumbent. Consequently, it will be extremely difficult for Competitors to acquire sufficient demand to invest into the transport infrastructure that is necessary to support disaggregated wholesale HSA services. This outcome threatens a core tenet of TRP 2015-326: the expectation that disaggregated wholesale HSA service will encourage Competitor investment in alternate transport facilities, thereby serving to develop a more robust telecommunications system.85

80. In summary, the competitive harms that call for Transitional FTTP Access occur immediately, as soon as a Wholesale HSA Service Gap develops, and are likely to persist for very long periods of time. Only expedited relief can prevent further competitive foreclosures resulting from new Wholesale HSA Service Gaps that will otherwise occur over the course of the better

85 Id., at para 139.
portion of the proceeding initiated by the Application. In addition, expedited relief is critical to allow Competitors to begin developing a presence where Wholesale HSA Service Gaps previously existed. Expedited Transitional FTTP Access will allow Competitors to mitigate competitive harms incurred thus far, with a view to building a critical mass of demand that can justify infrastructure investment to support disaggregated wholesale HSA services in the future.

81. Finally, expedited relief is necessary to counteract the strong incentive for Incumbents to delay the follow-up proceeding to TRP 2016-379 to implement disaggregated wholesale HSA services. As summarized in Part 2.0 of the Application, Incumbents have created extensive delays through failures to comply with the Commission’s disclosure and information rules. Such delays push back the final approval of disaggregated wholesale HSA rates and terms and conditions thereby creating additional opportunities to create and exploit Wholesale HSA Service Gaps. Transitional FTTP Access will counteract this incentive to delay the TRP 2016-379 follow-up costing proceedings and the eventual final approval of disaggregated wholesale HSA services.

82. Ultimately, expedited relief will allow the Commission to give effect to its intentions surrounding a disaggregated wholesale HSA service transition plan, as explicitly stated in TRP 2015-326, as of the soonest possible date. For this reason, and those described above, CNOC urges the Commission to grant Transitional FTTP Access on an expedited basis.

83. In order to facilitate expedited relief, CNOC requests an abbreviated period of fifteen (15) days for responses to the Application from the Incumbents and interventions from other interested parties. CNOC would then have seven (7) days to reply. CNOC submits that this abbreviated period for submissions strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring that parties have an adequate opportunity to provide meaningful comments with regards to the Application on one hand and on the other hand, appropriately accelerating this proceeding in light of the urgent nature of the relief that is being requested.

6.0 THE CANADIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY OBJECTIVES AND THE POLICY DIRECTION

84. Transitional FTTP Access on an expedited basis furthers the telecommunications policy objectives outlined in Section 7 of the Act in a manner that is consistent with the Policy Direction.
First, with respect to the telecommunications policy objectives, the relief requested in the Application is aligned with the following objectives of Section 7 of the Act:

- **Section 7(a) of the Act:** CNOC’s requested relief will facilitate the orderly development throughout Canada of a telecommunications system that serves to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the social and economic fabric of Canada and its regions. Transitional FTTP Access will eliminate Wholesale HSA Service Gaps throughout Canada and restore the conditions that can sustain a competitive telecommunications system in the affected areas.

- **Section 7(b) of the Act:** Transitional FTTP Access will render reliable and affordable telecommunications services of high quality accessible to Canadians in both urban and rural areas in all regions of Canada. CNOC’s requested relief will introduce consumer choice in areas where any Incumbent currently enjoys monopolistic market conditions. Competitive choice of providers, services features and price will translate into the availability of more reliable and affordable services throughout the country.

- **Section 7(c) of the Act:** Transitional FTTP Access will enhance the efficiency and competitiveness at the national and international levels, of Canadian telecommunications. The competitiveness of Canadian telecommunications services is threatened by the increasing incidence of Wholesale HSA Service Gaps that create competitive harms that can persist for several years. Expedited Transitional FTTP Access will eliminate Wholesale HSA Service Gaps that would otherwise occur in the future while also mitigating the economic harms associate with existing service gaps.

- **Section 7(e) of the Act:** Transitional FTTP Access will allow Competitors to develop the demand conditions that will one day allow them to invest in the transport infrastructure that is necessary to support disaggregated wholesale HSA services. This outcome therefore promotes the use of Canadian transmission facilities for telecommunications within Canada.
• Section 7(f) of the Act: Transitional FTTP Access is intended to give effect to the Commission’s TRP 2015-326 intent with respect to a transition plan for disaggregated wholesale HSA services. CNOC has carefully calibrated this relief so that it accords with TRP 2015-326, Commission precedents and speed matching principles. Transitional FTTP Access on an expedited basis is therefore regulation that is efficient and effective.

• Section 7(h) of the Act: The relief sought by way of the Application is intended to improve the levels of competition in downstream retail markets for Internet services and related telecommunications services. This goal is therefore intrinsically linked with the economic and social requirements of users of telecommunications.

86. Transitional FTTP Access on an expedited basis is also aligned with the following aspects of the Policy Direction:

• 1(a)(ii) the relief sought by CNOC consists of regulation that is efficient and proportionate to its purpose, which is to give effect to the Commission’s intent to ensure “wholesale access to the access facilities required to provision downstream retail services”.

• 1(b)(iv) Transitional FTTP Access is proposed in a technological and competitively neutral manner that does not artificially favor either Canadian carriers or ‘resellers’. This relief will apply to all Incumbent carriers on both ILEC and cable platforms. Furthermore, Transitional FTTP Access is intended to eliminate a situation of preference that exists for Canadian carriers, whereby Incumbent carriers are able to profit from monopolistic market conditions that the Commission did not intend to foster through TRP 2015-326.

• 1(c)(ii) Transitional FTTP Access will increase incentives for investment in and construction of competing network facilities. As aforementioned, this relief will eliminate a daunting barrier to the demand conditions that Competitors require to invest in transport infrastructure necessary to support disaggregated wholesale HSA services.
87. Transitional FTTP Access on an expedited basis is also consistent with the additional policy objectives that the Commission set out explicitly at paragraph 14 of TRP 2015-326. More specifically, CNOC’s requested relief is aligned with the Commission’s objective of:

- First, enhancing the effectiveness of the wholesale service regime to facilitate vibrant and sustainable retail competition that provides Canadians with reasonable prices and innovative services of high quality that are responsive to their evolving social and economic requirements\(^{86}\) - without Transitional FTTP Access, Canadians who happen to be situated in one of the many Wholesale HSA Service Gaps that are located throughout the country will be precluded from a choice of telecommunications services that includes reasonable prices and a full array of innovative services and service features.

- Second, incenting efficient network investment to further the development of facilities-based competition\(^ {87}\) - as discussed throughout this submission, Wholesale HSA Service Gaps prevent the development of demand conditions that are a condition precedent for competitive investment in transport facilities that are necessary to support disaggregated wholesale HSA services.

- Third, considering network efficiency, competitive neutrality, and technological neutrality when establishing wholesale regulations\(^ {88}\) - as explained above with respect to subparagraph 1(b)(iv) of the Policy Direction, CNOC has proposed Transitional FTTP Access in a manner that is both technologically and competitively neutral.

- Fourth and finally, recognizing differences in regional markets\(^ {89}\) - the Application is especially concerned with this objective of TRP 2015-326. Transitional FTTP Access will ensure that regional and more localized markets are not compromised by a Wholesale HSA Service Gap. The relief sought by

\(^{86}\) TRP 2015-326, at para 14.

\(^{87}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{88}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{89}\) *Ibid.*
CNOC is intended first and foremost, to ensure consistent wholesale access in all of Canada.

7.0 CONCLUSION

88. TRP 2015-326 is an intricate regulatory policy which carefully balances competing interests with a view to holistically furthering the Canadian telecommunications policy objectives in a manner that is consistent with the Policy Direction.

89. An effective transition plan to disaggregated wholesale HSA services is the very linchpin of TRP 2015-326.

90. It is now abundantly clear that the Commissions’ expectations regarding this transition plan have not unfolded as intended. The Commission committed to ensuring that wholesale access is always provided for. Instead, FTTP deployments in Greenfield and Brownfield situations have resulted in widespread Wholesale HSA Service Gaps.

91. Fortunately, the Commission has tools at its disposal to mitigate existing harms and prevent future consequences associated with Wholesale HSA Service Gaps. There is a wealth of regulatory precedent for the type of relief that CNOC is proposing. Very recently, in TO 2016-446, the Commission granted transitional wholesale access on a virtually identical, albeit narrower, set of circumstances. Expanding this relief as a general rule, wherever Wholesale HSA Service Gaps exist, is desperately needed. On these grounds, CNOC urges the Commission to grant Transitional FTTP Access on an expedited basis and to shorten the remaining periods for filings associated with this proceeding as described herein.

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